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This dissertation presents two essays to study both theoretically and empirically the
interaction of short-term funding and the banking system and its effects on systemic risk.
Before its collapse in September 2008, Lehman Brothers had been using the repurchase
agreement (repo) market to hide up to $50 billion from their balance sheet at the end of each
quarter. When this "Repo 105" scheme was uncovered (a type of strategy called window
dressing), the Securities and Exchange Commission conducted an inquiry into public US
financial institutions and concluded that Lehman was an isolated case. Using confidential
regulatory data on daily repo transactions from July 2008 to July 2014, in my first essay, I
show that non-US banks continue to remove an average of $170 billion from the US tri-party
repo market every quarter-end. This amount is more than double the $76 billion market-wide
drop in tri-party repo during the turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis and represents about
10% of the entire tri-party repo market. Window dressing induced deleveraging spills over
into agency bond markets and money market funds and affects market quality each quarter.
Demand deposit contracts provide liquidity to investors; however by their nature they
can expose the issuer to self-fulfilling runs. Existing models treat depositors as agents facing
uncertain liquidity shocks, who seek to insure against that liquidity risk through use of a
bank financed solely by deposits. Welfare-reducing bank runs then arise from the inher-
ent difficulties depositors face in coordinating their withdrawals. My second essay extends
the classic model of Diamond & Dybvig (1983) to allow for a more realistic mixed capital
structure where the bank’s investments are partly financed by equity, and where differing
incentives between shareholders and depositors are allowed to operate. I also further ex-
tend the model to allow shareholders to choose the level of risk in bank-financed projects.
I compute the ex-ante probability of a bank run in consideration of the bank capital ratio,
and I additionally compute the level of bank risk chosen by utility-maximizing shareholders
who are disciplined by uncoordinated depositors. I find that even in the absence of bank
negotiating power of the form in Diamond & Rajan (2000), banks can be welfare-improving
institutions, and there exists a socially optimal level of bank capital. I consider the policies
of a minimum capital requirement, deposit insurance, and suspension of convertibility, and
provide guidance on creating optimal bank regulation. I show that the level of bank capital
involves a tradeoff between sharing portfolio risk and sharing liquidity risk. Increased bank
capital results in less risk-sharing between shareholders and depositors. The demand deposit
contract disciplines the bank and its shareholders, and equity capital in effect disciplines the
depositors (by making runs less likely). There is a socially optimal level of natural bank
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Chapter 1: Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets
Introduction
I investigate the stability and composition of the repurchase agreement (repo) market and
how window dressing creates spillovers and affects systemic risk. Window dressing is the
practice in which financial institutions adjust their activity around an anticipated period
of oversight or public disclosure to appear safer or more profitable to outside monitors.
The repo market is a form of securitized banking that provides critical overnight funding
for the financial system but is vulnerable to runs. Several studies have suggested that
instability in the repo market—whether through a margin spiral effect in bilateral repo or
a run on individual institutions by their repo lenders in tri-party—helped cause the 2008
financial crisis.1 Its short-term nature means the repo market can also accommodate window
dressing, which was used by Lehman Brothers to hide leverage in the months leading up to its
bankruptcy. I show that repo market window dressing has continued to occur each quarter
since the 2008 financial crisis among non-U.S. bank dealers, and that window dressing creates
spillover effects in other markets.
I use confidential regulatory data on daily tri-party repo transaction summaries since
July 2008 obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Federal Reserve) and the
1See for example Gorton and Metrick (2012), Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014), Copeland, Martin,
and Walker (2011), Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2014), and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).
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U.S. Treasury Office of Financial Research. Tri-party repo is the ultimate source of cash
financing for many other repo transactions, and by extension much of the shadow banking
system. This dataset covers the entire $1.7 trillion tri-party repo market, includes details on
how much a dealer (a “cash borrower”) borrows using each type of collateral, and shows how
costly it is for the dealer to borrow each day. It also includes data starting from January
2011 on the network of daily repo borrowing between dealers and the various institutions
that are their repo counterparties (“cash lenders”). In a time series regression controlling for
dealers’ home regions, I show that broker-dealer subsidiaries of non-U.S. banks use repo to
window-dress roughly $170 billion of assets each quarter, in what appears to be a form of
regulatory arbitrage.
In Figure 1, I plot the daily tri-party repo borrowing to highlight this window dressing.
Each quarter-end is marked with a vertical gridline, and there is a pronounced decline and
subsequent rebound each quarter around that line. The steepness and width of that pattern
varies somewhat each quarter, but on average it represents about 10% of the entire tri-party
repo market. This quarterly decline is separate from longer-duration market trends: there
was a steep decline in repo borrowing following the 2008 financial crisis, but the market
gradually increased until the end of 2012. Since then the market has steadily declined—
likely due to the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases via quantitative easing (QE), which has
increased the scarcity of safe liquid assets typically financed in repo.2
I further examine where this decline in repo occurs by looking across dealers and
2For more on QE’s effects on the repo market, see the online note by Elamin and Bednar (2014): http:
//www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2014/0414/01banfin.cfm
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Figure 1.1. Daily Tri-Party Repo Outstanding
Notes: The vertical axis represents the value in trillions of dollars of collateral outstanding pledged in repo
each day from July 1, 2008 to July 31, 2014. Quarter-ends are marked with vertical dashed lines, and
year-ends are marked with heavier dash-dotted lines. I exclude repo borrowing by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, and I exclude the dates of 7/17/2008 and 4/11/2013 because of missing data from one of the
clearing banks.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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across types of repo collateral. I find that repo declines are concentrated in the broker-
dealer subsidiaries of non-U.S. bank holding companies, using primarily U.S. Treasuries
and agency securities. These results suggest a window dressing-based explanation for the
phenomenon. U.S. banks report the quarter average as well as quarter-end balance sheet
data and ratios, whereas non-U.S. banks only report quarter-end data. This regulatory
difference seems to explain why U.S. bank dealers don’t window-dress: U.S. banks have
little incentive to window-dress at the end of the quarter compared to any other time during
the quarter. Previous studies such as Owens and Wu (2012) and Downing (2012), which use
quarterly data or U.S. bank holding company data, find at best a mild quarter-end effect,
precisely because dealer bank window dressing occurs in just a few days and is mostly done
by non-U.S. banks (see Figure 2).
I establish that the decline in repo is caused by the non-U.S. bank dealers—not their
repo lenders—by combining this data with reports on money market mutual fund portfolio
holdings and assets under management from iMoneyNet and the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) form N-MFP, and quarterly bank parent balance sheet data from
Bankscope. I then perform a joint estimation of supply and demand in the repo market
and find that a non-U.S. dealer’s quarter-end window dressing is strongly predicted by its
leverage the prior quarter. To further identify causality, I use network data of repo fund-
ing between dealers and cash lenders to perform a within-lender regression that controls for
potential omitted cash supply factors.
I show significant spillover effects from repo window dressing to other markets. If
non-U.S. bank dealers window-dress to report lower leverage, then when they withdraw
collateral from repo, they must also sell those assets. I use the Financial Industry Reg-
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Figure 1.2. Repo Borrowing at the End of an Average Quarter
(Top left): I include a copy of Figure 1, with trillions of dollars in daily repo borrowing, as a reference.
(Top right): This figure represents the average daily repo outstanding over the course of a single quarter.
The average quarter has 62 trading days, and I position the end of the quarter (marked by a vertical line)
in the middle of the figure to highlight the quarter-end decline and subsequent rebound of repo borrowing.
The vertical axis again represents the market value of collateral in trillions of dollars.
(Bottom left): I separate the average repo outstanding over a single quarter by type of asset. The solid blue
line uses the left axis and represents average repo borrowing backed by the safest collateral: U.S. Treasuries,
agency debentures, and agency mortgage-backed securities, and agency collateralized mortgage obligations.
The dotted red line uses the right axis and represents average repo borrowing backed by all other types of
collateral. Both axes are in trillions of dollars.
(Bottom right): Here I present the average repo outstanding over a single quarter separated by the region of
the repo cash borrower (i.e., the dealer that is pledging collateral in the repo). The left and right axes are
both in billions of dollars. I exclude non-bank dealers from this subplot. The dotted green line represents
repo borrowing by U.S. bank dealers and can also be distinguished by its distinct behavior: this line touches
the left axis at roughly $780 billion and does not dip as markedly as the other two lines at the end of the
quarter. The solid blue line represents repo borrowing by European bank dealers. Both U.S. and European
bank dealer repo borrowing are in reference to the left axis. The dashed red line shows Japanese bank dealer
repo borrowing, and because Japanese bank dealers are a much smaller segment of the repo market, I plot
their line using the right axis.
Enlarged individual copies of these figures are included in the appendix.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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ulatory Authority’s (FINRA) Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) Agency
bond transaction-level data from 2010 to 2013 in a time series regression with time-fixed
effects for each quarter to test whether dealers are trading abnormally around the end of
the quarter. I find that dealers sell heavily to customers in the last days of the quarter and
immediately buy agency bonds back once the new quarter starts. In an empirical test of
the theoretical findings of Froot and Stein (1998), I find that this self-imposed deleveraging
causes a significant change in the market quality for agency bonds at quarter-end.
At the same time, declines in repo borrowing due to window dressing leave cash lenders
such as money market mutual funds with excess cash that they struggle to invest. My analysis
of monthly money market fund (MMF) portfolios shows that despite being able to anticipate
window dressing, MMFs are still unable to find any investment at all for about $20 billion
of cash each quarter-end before September 2013. The Federal Reserve’s reverse repurchase
agreement (RRP) program began at that time with the stated intention of being a tool for
raising interest rates, but it has become a substitute investment for repo lenders during times
of window dressing.
Section 1.1 of this paper reviews the current state of the literature, and how my findings
contribute to an understanding of repo markets and their potential for systemic risk and to
the literature on seasonality. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the repo markets and the
tri-party repo market’s important position relative to the bilateral and general collateral
repo markets. In section 1.3, I describe the datasets used in this paper, with a particular
focus on the regulatory tri-party repo data collection. Section 1.4 lays out my empirical
strategy to identify window dressing and establish dealers as the cause of it. I report the
results of robustness tests in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 shows how window dressing in repo
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markets has necessary repercussions in at least two other markets: the market for agency
bonds and the money market mutual fund industry. Section 1.7 concludes with some policy
recommendations to prevent future window dressing, or at least mitigate its impact.
1.1 Literature Review
My paper contributes to existing literature focused on three main areas: the stability of
repo markets, seasonality (and its underlying causes), and the risk management of financial
intermediaries.
Since 2008, a surge has occurred in the literature that analyzes the role that repo mar-
kets played in the financial crisis. Gorton and Metrick (2009, 2012) suggest that haircuts
on collateral in bilateral repo created a destabilizing feedback effect, forcing cash borrowers
to delever by selling assets in a fire sale, which caused haircuts to rise even higher, precipi-
tating the banking system’s insolvency. However Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2011) and
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) find that in tri-party repo there is no spiral effect,
and the crisis in tri-party repo is more consistent with a run on certain dealers by their cash
lenders.
Difficult to determine in this discussion is the direction of causation for the effects
these papers describe. Indeed, Gorton and Metrick (2012) admit that “without a structural
model of repo markets, we are only able to talk about co-movement. . . thus we use the lan-
guage of ‘correlation’ rather than ‘causation’ in our empirical analysis.” Martin, Skeie, and
von Thadden (2014) present a theoretical model of repo lending that extends earlier bank
run models from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994) to analyze runs on collater-
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alized repo borrowing instead of commercial bank deposits. The paper finds that liquidity
constraints (the size, short-term leverage, and profitability of a repo borrower), as well as
collateral constraints (the value to lenders from taking ownership of repo collateral directly,
the productivity of a borrower from continuing to manage collateral, as well as borrower size
and short-term leverage) determine a repo borrower’s ability to survive a crisis. However,
their model also predicts that outside of a crisis, each borrower invests (and borrows) as
much as possible.
In this paper I provide evidence that the quarterly decline in repo is not due to a
run-type panic, but rather due to repo becoming relatively less profitable at quarter-end
for non-U.S. bank dealers. This is consistent with Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2014),
who suggest that dealers will adjust their repo borrowing to trade off between profitability
and liquidity risk constraints. When repo is more profitable, their paper suggests dealers
will take more liquidity risk in the quantity and type of collateral they pledge, increasing
their exposure to the risk of a run by their cash lenders. Therefore, if there is a shock to
collateral again in the future (like the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper crisis), non-U.S.
bank tri-party borrowers may be the ones more vulnerable to a run.
This paper adds to extensive literature on seasonality. Since January effects were
documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Keim (1983), researchers have tried to find
underlying explanations for the effect. Ritter (1988) looks at the behavior of investors
around the turn of the year and finds individual investors may drive the January effect.
Constantinides (1984), Sias and Starks (1997), and Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) look
more deeply and find that underlying tax reasons might drive investors’ year-end abnormal
trading.
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Other papers suggest window dressing may explain seasonal effects. Haugen and Lakon-
ishok (1987) suggest the January effect might be explained by fund managers adjusting their
portfolios to appear safer for their end-of-year filings. Lakonishok et al. (1991) investigate
pension fund managers and find they sell losers in the fourth quarter to make it appear that
they are good at picking stocks. In a sample of banks from 1978 to 1986, Allen and Saunders
(1992) claim to find upward window dressing, in which banks increase their balance sheet
each quarter to appear larger. Musto (1997) finds further support for this by examining
the difference in trading behavior of commercial paper and Treasury bills around the year-
end, and suggests that intermediaries don’t want to show a risky portfolio to regulators or
investors. However, Wermers (1999) finds no evidence of window dressing by mutual fund
managers at the end of the year versus other quarters. In contrast, I do not see much evi-
dence of January effects in repo, but I do find support for window dressing at the quarterly
frequency, which spills over into fixed income markets.
In the repo market specifically, the literature has looked for evidence of window dressing
or a liquidity habitat preference. So far the results for window dressing have been mixed.
Owens and Wu (2012) and Downing (2012) look at U.S. bank repo behavior at the end of the
quarter versus quarter average repo borrowing, and find that banks window-dress modestly
at the end of the quarter. However, they are unable to definitively claim that they find
window dressing and not just a shift in banks’ funding sources. In section 1.5, I show that
controlling for the country of a bank dealer is critical to interpreting their results.
Non-U.S. banks were outside the scope of those previous studies, but it is precisely
among non-U.S. bank dealers that I find significant window dressing. U.S. banks report
the quarter-average as well as quarter-end balance sheet data and ratios, whereas non-U.S.
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banks only report quarter-end data. This regulatory difference may help explain why U.S.
bank dealers don’t window-dress: U.S. banks have little incentive to window-dress at the end
of the quarter compared to any other time during the quarter. Other institutional features,
or differences in the regulatory environment inside and outside the U.S. may also contribute
to a dealer’s decision to window-dress, however, differential monitoring seems likely to be a
primary factor.
A series of papers by Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2005) and Kotomin, Smith, and
Winters (2008) propose that window dressing does not occur in repo, but, instead, repo
declines are driven by a preferred liquidity habitat model as in Modigliani and Sutch (1966).
In this scenario banks do not actively reduce their repo borrowing to hide leverage. Instead,
cash suppliers, such as money market funds, must cut their repo lending in order to redeem
their own investors’ outflows. In this paper I provide evidence from two data sources on
money market funds that show that money funds do not see outflows nearly as large as the
drop in repo outstanding, and, in fact, repo lenders have an excess of cash at the end of
the quarter. I further identify the quarterly decline as dealer-driven using a within-investor
estimation approach similar to that of Khwaja & Mian (2008), which uses time and investor-
fixed effects to control for unobserved demand factors.
Theoretical models by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998)
suggests that capital structure policy plays a critical role in risk management. A key im-
plication of their framework for financial intermediaries (including dealers) is that capital
adequacy constraints will generate asymmetric price effects in intermediated markets. When
dealers are capital-constrained, they will offer worse prices to trades that tighten capital
constraints, and better prices to trades that relax those constraints. Empirical research by
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Naik and Yadav (2003) uses daily detailed position data on each UK government bond dealer
and supports these conjectures.
Recent work by Koijen and Yogo (2013) finds that regulatory arbitrage by financial
intermediaries has real economic effects as well. Their study of U.S. life insurers shows
that risk transfers to off-balance-sheet and affiliated entities has the effect of reducing the
insurers’ risk-based capital, and increases their probability of default by a factor of 3.5.
Moreover, they estimate that eliminating this regulatory arbitrage would increase the life
insurance prices offered by those companies by 12%, and reduce the overall amount of U.S.
life insurance provided to households. Although these effects are much harder to detect
during the quarter among bank dealers, who can take risk through a diverse portfolio rather
than a single product like life insurance, I present evidence that dealer window dressing does
reduce market quality at the quarter-end when non-U.S. dealers are deleveraging.
1.2 Mechanics of the Repo Markets
This section provides a basic explanation of how a repurchase agreement works, the differ-
ences in the institutional operations of each of the three repo markets, and why tri-party
repo matters to the financial system. Readers who are already familiar with repo may wish
to skip ahead to Section 3.
A repurchase agreement (commonly shortened to “repo”) is a contract in which one
party sells securities with the agreement to repurchase those same securities at a specified
maturity date. The other party pays cash for those securities and promises to return them
when the repo matures and receive their cash plus interest, similar to a collateralized loan.
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The second party (the cash lender) typically assigns a haircut to the cash amount they
pay, relative to the market value of securities received, as protection in case the first party
(the cash borrower) defaults and fails to return the cash. A repo is treated legally as a
“true sale,” which means the repo collateral is exempt from an automatic stay in bankruptcy
if the cash borrower defaults, and the cash lender can sell or hold the securities without
any encumbrance. However, many cash lenders will accept collateral that their charter or
prospectus would not permit them to hold directly—for example, money market mutual
funds (MMMFs) lending cash in repo against long-dated mortgage-backed securities (an-
other form of regulatory arbitrage). A default of the cash borrower could then force the cash
lender to immediately sell those securities, regardless of the market liquidity environment.
A larger haircut protects cash lenders from potential losses when liquidating collateral in
adverse market conditions, as well as from sudden fluctuations in the collateral’s value.
Example:
Figure 3 shows a sample repurchase agreement. Dealer A is borrowing $10,000,000 cash
overnight from money market fund B at a 2% nominal annual percentage rate, and pledging
U.S. Treasury notes as collateral. Dealer A has simultaneously agreed to repurchase the
securities the next day from money market fund B for $10,000,556 ($10,000,000 + 2%/360
days * $10,000,000). Money market fund B assesses a 1% haircut against U.S. Treasury
collateral pledged by Dealer A, so in order to obtain the $10M cash, Dealer A has pledged
U.S. Treasury notes worth $10,101,010 ($10,000,000/99%).
The market for repurchase agreements is divided into three main segments: bilateral,
general collateral finance, and tri-party. Figure 4 visually depicts a stylized version of the flow
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Figure 1.3. A Sample Repurchase Agreement Transaction
Source: OFR analysis
of cash and collateral between participants in these different types of repo. In subsections
1.2.1 through 1.2.3, I offer more details about the key institutional differences and connections
between these markets.
1.2.1 Bilateral Repo Market
The bilateral repo market is unique in that its trades do not settle on the books of the two
large clearing banks—Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Instead,
bilateral repos (also called Delivery versus Payment repos) are negotiated and settled directly
between dealers and their clients. Dealers can act as either cash borrowers or cash lenders,
and their counterparties are primarily hedge funds and real estate investment trusts (REITs),
though banks and other institutions may participate to a smaller extent. The purpose of
13
Figure 1.4. A Stylized Diagram of Repo Market Participants and
Cash/Collateral Flows
Each arrow represents the direction of cash in a repo agreement; this means collateral moves in the opposite
direction. Tri-party repo is denoted by two purple arrows both pointing to the left, passing through the
rectangle representing the two tri-party custodians. Cash funding is provided from the investors in the
right-most box to the broker-dealers in the center of the figure, in exchange for collateral. Tri-party repo is
the largest of three repo markets and a primary cash source for the other two.
General Collateral Finance (GCF) repo is denoted by the two red dotted lines in the middle of the figure
that curve and point counterclockwise. This market is inter-dealer and backed only by high-quality collateral:
Treasuries, agency mortgage-backed securities, and agency debentures. GCF repo provides funding from one
dealer to another, similar to the fed funds market for banks.
Bilateral repo is shown by the solid green arrows on the left half of the figure. The bilateral repo arrows
point in both directions because broker-dealers both borrow from and lend to the various institutions shown
in the oval on the far left.
Source: OFR analysis
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bilateral is also distinct from tri-party and general collateral finance (GCF) repo: bilateral
repo is reportedly driven by market participants’ needs to acquire specific securities for
hedging or settlement purposes, not just to finance a portfolio. A recent study from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York using primary dealer data estimates U.S. Treasuries
currently make up 90% of bilateral repo collateral.3 The estimated size of the bilateral repo
market varies: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates the size of the bilateral repo
market at $1.4 trillion, on par with tri-party repo daily volume.
1.2.2 General Collateral Finance Repo Market
A general collateral finance (GCF) repo is an inter-dealer repo centrally cleared by the
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC) over Fedwire, in which the cash borrower and
cash lender directly negotiate a rate and duration for the repo, and specify a class of assets
(e.g., all mortgage-backed securities, or Treasuries with fewer than five years to maturity)
rather than specific securities, which can be pledged as collateral. GCF repos are unique
in that they have no haircut margin. The cash borrower can continue to use his or her
securities freely to make markets and clear trades that day until 11 a.m., when the cash
borrower must identify the specific securities it will actually deliver to the cash lender. GCF
repo was designed to improve inter-dealer liquidity by netting obligations through the FICC
and giving dealers flexibility to substitute collateral throughout the day as their portfolio
changes. In 2012 the GCF repo market’s total (pre-netting) average daily volume was $400
billion. However, since then the market has shrunk considerably, to only $210 billion per
3See note by Copeland, Davis, LeSueur, and Martin (2014): http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.
org/2014/07/lifting-the-veil-on-the-us-bilateral-repo-market.html .
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day in June 2014.4
1.2.3 Tri-party Repo Market
The tri-party repo market gets its name from the manner in which transactions are cleared.
Tri-party repo counterparties transact through one of two custodian banks: Bank of New
York Mellon and JPMorgan Chase. These two custodians provide tools to value collateral
and apply haircuts for cash lenders, and help cash borrowers allocate their portfolio across
lenders to achieve the lowest cost of financing. Collateral is moved from a cash borrower’s
account with the custodian to the cash lender’s account with the custodian in exchange for
cash at the start of a repo, and the transaction is reversed the next morning when the repo
is unwound.5
The tri-party repo market finances approximately $1.7 trillion of collateral each day.
There are 14 broad classes of collateral accepted, but over 80% of repos are backed by the
most liquid assets: U.S. Treasuries or agency-backed securities. There are 63 different deal-
ers, who get their cash funding from 170 different cash lenders (aggregating all subsidiaries
to the parent level). Most cash lenders are either money market mutual funds (MMMFs),
or securities lending agents, but insurance companies, corporations, municipalities, com-
mercial banks, and central banks also participate.6 Money market funds can invest cash
across a variety of high quality short-term investments such as commercial paper, bankers’
4Source: DTCC: http://www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index.aspx .
5In a term repo, this daily unwind still occurs, meaning the custodian extends an intraday loan to the
cash borrower until the term repo is rewound in the afternoon. The Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform
Task Force has identified this intraday lending as a significant risk, and the two custodians have committed
to developing a new settlement regime by the end of 2014 that is much less dependent on intraday credit
provision (http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2014/0213_2014.html .)
6I determine this using supplementary tri-party repo data on cash lenders from January 2011, to July
2014.
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acceptances, Treasury bills, variable rate demand notes, and repos. Because repos are fully
collateralized with a haircut margin, they are a useful way for cash investors to limit their
overall counterparty exposure to a dealer.7
As part of the custodian-investor relationship, cash lenders submit a custodial agree-
ment that includes a schedule of haircuts to apply to the value of collateral pledged by each
dealer in each asset class. The custodian will follow that agreement and can mark collateral
to market and apply the haircut on the investor’s behalf. The haircut may vary across asset
classes (e.g., haircuts on riskier collateral such as corporate bonds or equities are typically
above 5%, while haircuts on safer assets like U.S. Treasuries or agency securities may be as
low as 1% or 2%), and may also vary by a cash lender’s dealer counterparties.
Once set, haircut schedules are very inflexible. Anecdotally, when I asked cash lender
repo participants and regulators to describe how haircuts are determined, they all responded
that it is very burdensome to change the haircut: it takes around a dozen signatures up and
down the firm to amend the haircut schedule, and money funds may also have to announce
the change to their investors. If a cash lender decides a certain borrower or type of collateral
is too risky, they will increase the repo rate they charge or reduce the quantity they lend,
instead of adjusting haircuts. This is consistent with the findings of Krishnamurthy, Nagel,
and Orlov (2014), who noted during the 2008 financial crisis that the tri-party repo market
did not see a haircut spiral like Gorton and Metrick (2009, 2012) described in bilateral repo.
Part of the custodian’s services to dealers is that they assist in the collateral alloca-
tion process. This means that each day the custodian bank will allocate a cash borrower’s
portfolio to whichever lenders are cheapest for that collateral. If a cash supplier tightens
7For example, other counterparty exposure could arise through holding that dealer’s commercial paper.
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lending, then its cash borrowers can move to the next cheapest source of financing (taking
into account both the changing interest rate and the stable haircut).
1.3 Data
Table 1.1.
Summary of Data Sources
Market Data Source Frequency, Granularity Description
of Data
Tri-Party Repo Federal Reserve Daily, by Dealer & Daily Summaries of Tri-Party
Board of Governors Collateral Type Repo Transactions
Bank Holding Bankscope Quarterly, for each Balance Sheet
Companies Bank Holding Company Information
Money Market iMoneyNet Daily, by Each Fund Money Market Funds’
Mutual Funds Assets Under Management
Money Market SEC Form N-MFP Monthly, by Each Fund Complete Money Market
Mutual Funds (since Nov 2010) Fund Portfolio
Agency Bonds FINRA TRACE Intra-Day Transactions, Agency Bond Market
(via WRDS) CUSIP-level, with Dealer-Reported
(since March 2010) Counterparty Type Transactions
Source: OFR analysis
Triparty Repo Data:
Tri-party repo market daily transaction summaries are obtained through the Office
of Financial Research and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who in turn receive the
data as reports from the two tri-party custodians, Bank of New York Mellon and JPMorgan
Chase. The data in this sample begins July 1, 2008, and the sample ends July 31, 2014. The
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data includes the daily amount of cash borrowings for each dealer by each collateral asset
class, as well as the market value including interest due at the end of the repo. The ratio of
those two quantities gives a measure of the dealer’s overall cost of borrowing in that asset
class (haircut plus interest, aggregated across all the dealer’s counterparties).
I omit July 17, 2008, and April 11, 2013 from the sample, because on those two days
I am missing data from one of the custodian banks. I also omit repos in which the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York is a cash borrower from the sample, because of its role as a
regulator, which causes it to behave very differently from other repo participants.8
The total average daily size of the tri-party repo market is $1.7 trillion during the
sample period, and the majority of tri-party repo is backed by high-quality assets. The two
largest asset classes are agency mortgage-backed securities and U.S. Treasuries and strips,
which together comprise 69% of collateral pledged, followed by agency debentures and agency
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) (another 15% of the market). Table 2 provides
summary statistics for the sizes of each asset class.
iMoneyNet, N-MFP
Money market mutual funds are a primary cash lender in the tri-party repo markets,
so I use two separate datasets to observe how their portfolio changes at the end of each
quarter.
iMoneyNet tracks the performance and portfolio composition of more than 1,600 U.S.
money market funds and reports each money market fund’s daily assets under management
(AUM) as well as the type of fund (prime, government, or municipal).
In 2010 the SEC implemented reforms to the money market fund industry to reduce
8See subsection 1.6.2 for an example of this.
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Table 1.2.
Summary Statistics for the Tri-Party Repo Market
This table shows summary statistics for the size and composition of assets pledged as collateral in the
tri-party repo market from July 1, 2008, to July 31, 2014.
Asset Class Average Daily Repo $ Volume Standard Deviation of
Daily Repo $ Volume
Agency CMOs $ 103,194,451,024 $ 22,553,502,217
Agency Debenture $ 149,569,102,420 $ 64,636,803,823
Agency MBS $ 616,533,453,994 $ 114,945,935,282
U.S. Treasuries and Strips $ 569,974,504,613 $ 71,111,887,693
Total Fed-Eligible
Collateral $ 1,439,271,512,051 $ 163,851,945,388
Asset Backed Securities $ 40,386,045,329 $ 7,718,426,654
Cash $ 671,831,740 $ 1,476,710,744
Corporate Bonds $ 90,942,450,339 $ 27,226,322,099
DTC-Other $ 1,612,224,985 $ 1,847,938,550
Equity $ 90,418,652,876 $ 26,316,780,190
Money Market $ 25,232,797,297 $ 9,090,884,810
Municipal Bonds $ 14,670,908,771 $ 4,249,596,754
Other $ 2,721,950,275 $ 1,704,534,903
Private Label CMO $ 40,721,757,360 $ 14,305,285,726
Whole Loans $ 5,103,289,663 $ 6,327,712,831
Total Non-Fed-Eligible
Collateral $ 312,481,908,635 $ 63,887,940,704
Total $ 1,751,753,420,686 $ 194,858,199,512
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
risk and improve disclosure. As part of that reform, money market funds have reported their
detailed portfolio holdings every month since November 2010 in form N-MFP. These filings
become public 60 days after filing, and the last filing I use is June 2014.
Bankscope
Bankscope reports data on the quarterly balance sheets of U.S. and international banks.
I specifically use the balance sheets of banks whose dealers borrow in the tri-party repo
market from June 2008 to June 2014, to match the time series of the repo data I have.
Some Japanese banks’ balance sheets are incomplete or unavailable in Bankscope, and this
makes it difficult to empirically analyze the effect of a bank’s balance sheet on repo behavior
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for bank dealers from Japan. For that reason I consider Japanese banks separately from
European banks when I look at non-U.S. bank dealer activity in repo. For the U.S. and
Europe, I do not run into issues with sample size or statistical power.
TRACE
The SEC mandates that broker-dealers report their transactions in eligible fixed-income
securities. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority collects these transactions through
the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), and makes a nonconfidential version
of this content available to researchers through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS),
which I use. Each transaction report identifies the dealer’s counterparty as either another
dealer or a customer, and the report details the security identifier (CUSIP), price, quantity,
and direction of the trade. TRACE reports this data by the type of security, which in WRDS
can be corporate bonds or agency bonds. I use the TRACE agency dataset, which begins in
March 2010 and continues through June 2014.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Repo Declines Significantly at Quarter-End
The decline in repo is visually apparent and statistically very pronounced. Panel A of Table 3
reports a regression of aggregate repo borrowing in the entire market and by the region of
bank dealers, using indicator variables for each of the five days preceding and following the
end of a quarter. Because the size of the repo market varies over time, I include fixed effects
for each quarter. Column (4) of Table 3 shows that in aggregate, quarter-end repo is $169.4
billion below typical levels. However, on the first day of the quarter, repo strongly rebounds
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and continues to pick up over the next five days. Panel (B) repeats this analysis, but adds
one-day lagged repo borrowing to account for auto-regression in the data and highlight the
rebound in repo borrowing around the change of a quarter. Columns (2) and (3) of both
Panels (A) and (B) show that this decline and rebound are strongly present in European and
Japanese bank dealers as well. Even though their normal repo borrowing is comparable to
European bank dealers, the U.S. decline in column (1) is an order of magnitude smaller and
largely insignificant. This partially explains why previous studies using U.S. bank holding
company Y-9C statements (such as Owens and Wu (2012) and Downing (2012)) fail to find
seasonality or window dressing in the repo market: of all bank dealers, those of the U.S. do
it the least.
European and Japanese bank dealers reduce their cash borrowing at quarter-end, and
they do this consistently across the entire sample. Table 5 reports just quarter-end indicators
for each quarter in our sample (2008 Q3 to 2014 Q2). For Europe and Japan, bank dealers
reduce their repo borrowing every single quarter. U.S. bank dealers don’t follow a consistent
pattern. Sometimes they reduce their repo, but just as often their repo borrowing will
increase at the quarter-end.
Just as the decline in repo is concentrated in non-U.S. borrowers, the decline is hap-
pening only in safer collateral. Table 6 reports quarter-end declines separately for safe
collateral—defined as U.S. Treasuries, agency MBS and agency debentures, and money mar-
ket collateral—and for all other types of collateral. Safer collateral is $148 billion below
normal at the quarter-end, when accounting for quarterly fixed effects. Riskier collateral




Quarter-End Changes in Repo by Region
In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variable is the total daily market value of collateral pledged in U.S.
tri-party repo by all bank dealers whose parent company is headquartered in a given region, which can be
the U.S., Europe, or Japan. Column (4) instead uses the daily aggregate market value of collateral pledged
by all dealers (bank as well as non-bank) in the entire U.S. tri-party repo market, regardless of dealers’ home
countries. In Panel A, the regressors are indicator variables for each of the five business days preceding and
following a change in calendar quarter, as well as the last and first business day of a month that isn’t the
end or start of a quarter. In Panel B, the specification is the same except I add the auto-regressive term
RepoBorrowingregion, t−1, as suggested by an AIC test. Estimation is based on OLS regression with time-
fixed effects for each quarter in the sample period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Indicator Variables for Time-of-Quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Repo Borrowing by Region U.S. Bank European Bank Japanese Bank Aggregate Repo
($ Billions) Dealers Dealers Dealers Borrowing
Fifth-to-Last Day of a Quarter -8.729 -47.74*** -4.178*** -62.60***
(8.790) (10.40) (1.111) (11.49)
Fourth-to-Last Day of a Quarter -9.343 -57.50*** -5.162*** -72.82***
(9.113) (10.03) (1.243) (10.70)
Third-to-Last Day of a Quarter -10.83 -72.29*** -6.838*** -90.40***
(9.459) (9.642) (1.353) (11.10)
Second-to-Last Day of a Quarter -16.82* -96.53*** -7.609*** -119.1***
(9.620) (10.09) (1.398) (13.57)
Last Day of a Quarter -11.15 -150.9*** -8.802*** -169.4***
(13.10) (12.25) (1.298) (19.71)
First Day of a Quarter 7.011 -62.12*** -4.700*** -55.35***
(7.848) (9.520) (0.832) (14.53)
Second Day of a Quarter 5.397 -48.04*** -3.245*** -43.20***
(7.420) (8.421) (0.535) (12.66)
Third Day of a Quarter 4.172 -42.98*** -2.711*** -38.94***
(6.963) (8.804) (0.523) (12.30)
Fourth Day of a Quarter 1.747 -36.18*** -2.294*** -35.30***
(7.107) (7.519) (0.466) (11.06)
Fifth Day of a Quarter 3.868 -33.99*** -2.031*** -30.87***
(6.827) (6.157) (0.477) (9.892)
Last Day of a Month That Isn’t a 7.183* 0.0272 0.0349 7.049*
Quarter-End (3.819) (2.233) (0.318) (4.098)
First Day of a Month That 2.340 13.02*** 0.388 16.09***
Isn’t the First Day of a Quarter (2.629) (1.377) (0.323) (3.296)
Constant 724.9*** 855.7*** 43.04*** 1,749***
(0.661) (0.795) (0.111) (1.080)
Observations 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522
R-squared 0.018 0.414 0.323 0.342
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (continued)
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Panel B: AR(1) Term Added to Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Repo Borrowing by Region U.S. Bank European Japanese Bank Aggregate Repo
($ Billions) Dealers Dealers Dealers Borrowing
Yesterday’s Repo Borrowing 0.873*** 0.902*** 0.893*** 0.878***
(0.0352) (0.0308) (0.0275) (0.0288)
Fifth-to-Last Day of a Quarter -3.832* -15.16*** -1.049** -20.20***
(2.128) (2.535) (0.485) (3.890)
Fourth-to-Last Day of a Quarter -1.519 -14.04*** -1.401*** -17.10***
(2.259) (2.627) (0.413) (3.479)
Third-to-Last Day of a Quarter -2.470 -20.02*** -2.198*** -25.70***
(2.530) (2.314) (0.345) (3.154)
Second-to-Last Day of a Quarter -7.160*** -30.91*** -1.472*** -38.95***
(2.529) (4.849) (0.364) (5.183)
Last Day of a Quarter 3.735 -63.38*** -1.977*** -64.12***
(6.196) (5.897) (0.454) (11.75)
First Day of a Quarter 0.949 55.18*** 4.070*** 59.86***
(6.305) (6.243) (0.738) (10.76)
Second Day of a Quarter -0.399 8.432*** 0.988** 6.170
(2.436) (2.584) (0.401) (4.012)
Third Day of a Quarter -0.215 0.795 0.222 -0.238
(1.789) (3.138) (0.301) (2.694)
Fourth Day of a Quarter -1.571 3.024 0.163 -0.325
(1.808) (1.989) (0.308) (3.483)
Fifth Day of a Quarter 2.666 -0.920 0.0531 0.899
(2.474) (1.913) (0.248) (3.374)
Last Day of a Month That Isn’t a 6.587*** -1.018 -0.139 5.681
Quarter-End (1.970) (2.411) (0.222) (3.577)
First Day of a Month That Isn’t -3.725 13.38*** 0.386** 10.69***
the First Day of a Quarter (2.901) (1.931) (0.168) (3.805)
Constant 91.93*** 83.18*** 4.569*** 213.3***
(25.53) (26.30) (1.193) (50.43)
Observations 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522
R-squared 0.762 0.899 0.855 0.861
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
24
Table 1.5.
Quarter-End Drops In Repo Borrowing Over Time
In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variable is the total daily market value of collateral pledged in U.S.
tri-party repo by all bank dealers whose parent company is headquartered in a given region, which can be
the U.S., Europe, or Japan. Column (4) instead uses the daily aggregate market value of collateral pledged
by all dealers (bank as well as non-bank) in the entire U.S. tri-party repo market, regardless of dealers’ home
countries. The regressors are indicator variables for the last business day of each quarter in the sample, to
indicate how the size of the quarter-end decline in repo borrowing changes over time. Estimation is based
on OLS regression with time-fixed effects for each quarter in the sample period. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are used to determine significance, but not reported separately due to space constraints. *,
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Total Repo Borrowing by Region (1) (2) (3) (4)
($ Billions) U.S. Bank European Bank Japanese Bank Aggregate Repo
Quarter & Year Fixed Effects Dealers Dealers Dealers Borrowing
2008Q3 128.4*** -84.31*** -5.384*** -111.5***
2008Q4 13.14*** -331.8*** -1.597*** -333.0***
2009Q1 -105.5*** -171.0*** -7.679*** -281.9***
2009Q2 -164.6*** -197.3*** -0.527*** -363.0***
2009Q3 -75.09*** -144.9*** -1.900*** -227.4***
2009Q4 -86.09*** -202.6*** 2.045*** -290.2***
2010Q1 -81.13*** -168.0*** -2.404*** -261.0***
2010Q2 -48.41*** -110.2*** -0.0172*** -176.3***
2010Q3 -40.29*** -147.9*** -0.938*** -157.0***
2010Q4 -6.341*** -228.8*** -5.102*** -254.7***
2011Q1 -0.345*** -165.8*** -12.82*** -163.4***
2011Q2 8.424*** -118.6*** -13.91*** -104.7***
2011Q3 49.85*** -105.7*** -13.90*** -45.76***
2011Q4 15.22*** -74.31*** -6.012*** -68.86***
2012Q1 6.913*** -94.08*** -13.10*** -92.32***
2012Q2 53.53*** -122.0*** -8.168*** -48.36***
2012Q3 58.51*** -135.9*** -10.16*** -67.75***
2012Q4 27.16*** -169.8*** -13.99*** -143.9***
2013Q1 -47.02*** -114.6*** -16.13*** -157.6***
2013Q2 6.149*** -144.5*** -15.06*** -142.3***
2013Q3 17.08*** -72.09*** -12.04*** -48.12***
2013Q4 13.55*** -145.7*** -16.76*** -148.1***
2014Q1 -31.54*** -78.52*** -14.10*** -112.8***
2014Q2 24.41*** -105.0*** -6.993*** -71.09***
Constant 725.0*** 848.1*** 42.38*** 1,742***
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
R-squared 0.076 0.199 0.132 0.185
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Table 1.6.
Declines in Quarter-End Repo Borrowing by Type of Collateral
In Column (1) the dependent variable is the total daily market value of fed-eligible collateral pledged in
U.S. tri-party repo by all dealers. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the total daily market value of
non-fed-eligible collateral pledged in U.S. tri-party repo by all dealers. Regressors are indicator variables
for the last and first business days of a quarter and the last and first business days of a month that isn’t the
end or start of a quarter. Estimation is based on OLS regression with time-fixed effects for each quarter in
the sample period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Total Repo Borrowing by Collateral Type (1) (2)
($ Billions) Fed-Eligible Collateral non-Fed-Eligible Collateral
Last Day of a Quarter -147.8*** -12.92***
(17.90) (4.384)
First Day of a Quarter -47.81*** 1.082
(11.72) (6.262)
Last Day of a Month That Isn’t a 14.94*** 0.710
Quarter-End (4.185) (0.986)
First Day of Month That Isn’t the 23.87*** 0.979





Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
26
1.4.2 The Role of Cash Suppliers in Seasonal Repo Volume
A simple explanation for the decline in tri-party repo could be that cash lenders hoard
liquidity at the end of the quarter for their own purposes. Money market mutual funds are
one of the primary lenders in the tri-party repo market, and they could cut their lending
to meet outflows by their own investors at the end of the quarter. Those investors in turn
could need cash to settle obligations like dividend payouts, taxes, settlement on derivatives,
or debt payments. In other words, knowing only the quantity of repo, I would not be able
to determine whether repo demand effects or repo supply effects are driving the quarter-end
decline. Data from both iMoneyNet and the new form N-MFP filings (starting in November
2010) show that cash supply is not causing the drop in repo.
Using daily data on from iMoneyNet, I apply the same specification I used in Panel
B of Table 3 except I use money funds’ assets under management (AUM) as the dependent
variable. Table 7 shows that money funds do see outflows at the end of the quarter followed
by inflows at the start of the new quarter, but they are less than a tenth the size of repo
declines. Additionally, there is no significant decline in MMFs’ AUM before the last day
of the quarter, unlike the accelerating drawdown over several days that happens in repo.
Therefore, money fund outflows cannot explain the size and scope of the repo market effect.
Although money funds are one of the two primary types of cash lenders in tri-party
repo, they are not the only tri-party cash provider. Securities lending agents also reinvest
cash collateral in tri-party repo, so a regular and sudden quarter-end unwinding of securities
lending could also pull cash out of the tri-party repo system. Although I do not have data
on securities lending covering this period, I do have data on money market funds’ detailed
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Table 1.7.
Money Market Fund Changes in AUM around Quarter-End
The dependent variable is the total daily assets under management (AUM) of all U.S. money market mutual
funds (MMFs) in millions of dollars, and excluding tax-free MMFs. Feeder funds are excluded from this
amount. Data on the type of a fund and its AUM is obtained from iMoneyNet, and spans the time period
from July 1, 2008, to February 13, 2014. Lagged total MMF AUM is included to account for auto-regression.
In columns (1) and (2), indicator variables for the last day of a quarter, and the days surrounding a quarter-
end and a month-end (that isn’t a quarter-end) are included, respectively. In columns (3) and (4), I modify
all of the indicator variables to only indicate those quarter- (month-) ends in which the last business day of
that quarter (month) is also a Friday, to control for potential cash outflows to meet MMF investors’ cash
needs, such as for payroll. Estimation is based on OLS regression with time-fixed effects for each quarter in
the sample period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(7/1/2008–2/13/2014) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total MMF AUM ($ millions, and Only Friday Only Friday
excluding tax-free funds) Quarter-ends Quarter-ends
Yesterday’s AUM 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000***
(0.000840) (0.000761) (0.000856) (0.000828)
Fifth-to-Last Day of a Quarter 5,125** 4,492
(2,041) (4,501)
Fourth-to-Last Day of a Quarter 1,981 4,689***
(1,718) (1,543)
Third-to-Last Day of a Quarter 1,790 -1,067
(1,380) (1,441)
Second-to-Last Day of a Quarter -2,411 1,927
(1,902) (1,982)
Last day of a Quarter -12,447*** -13,748*** -14,078*** -14,008***
(2,425) (2,625) (2,392) (2,404)
First day of a Quarter 1,003 -5,855**
(2,603) (2,689)
Second day of a Quarter 9,053*** 6,495***
(2,043) (1,437)
Third day of a Quarter 3,926*** 4,567**
(1,251) (2,280)
Fourth day of a Quarter 2,930** 537.4
(1,299) (2,630)
Fifth day of a Quarter 2,495* -1,078
(1,372) (1,962)
Second-to-Last Day of a Month 298.7 3,018*
That Isn’t a Quarter-End (1,390) (1,593)
Last Day of a Month That Isn’t a -12,553*** -13,322***
Quarter-End (1,635) (2,673)
First Day of a Month that Isn’t -2,197 -5,128*
the Start of a Quarter (1,781) (2,749)
Second Day of a Month that Isn’t 9,600*** 11,223***
the Start of a Quarter (846.1) (1,206)
Constant 1,409 172.1 1,652 819.0
(2,098) (1,896) (2,138) (2,061)
Observations 1,405 1,526 1,405 1,526
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Source: iMoneyNet
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portfolio holdings from the new form N-MFP, which contradicts this account.
Since form N-MFP is a monthly, not quarterly, filing, I do not have to worry about
money funds themselves window-dressing their quarter-end holdings any more than they
would for a different month. Therefore, I can compare quarter-end holdings to holdings
at the end of other months to see what changes. Table 8 shows that at the quarter-end,
money funds’ repo holdings decline, even though their AUM does not decline significantly.
I omit non-repo asset classes from the table because no other reported investment classes
have significant quarter-end changes. However, the remainder from subtracting the sum of
all its investments from a fund’s reported AUM reveals the amount of uninvested cash.9
Table 9 reports that money funds are holding excess cash at the end of the quarter,
both individually and in aggregate. Money market funds specialize in making short-term
investments, but prime and government/agency MMFs together cannot find temporary in-
vestments for nearly $20 billion dollars,10 meaning there is an excess—not a shortage—of
cash supply at quarter-end. If securities lenders or other tri-party repo cash suppliers were
choosing to cut their repo lending and dealers’ demand for repo was unchanged, dealers
would have been able substitute and borrow cash from money market funds instead, and
money market funds would not have this excess cash.
9Normally, a money fund will actually have a cash balance of zero or just slightly less than zero, with any
shortfall due to the fact that a sponsor may have invested its own money in the fund to support it, which is
not reflected in the fund’s AUM.
10$12.62 billion for prime MMFs, $7.188 billion for govt/agency MMFs, see column (4) of Table 9.
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Table 1.8.
MMF Repo Cash Lending at the End of the Quarter
In Panels A and B, column (1), the dependent variable is the assets under management (AUM) of an
individual prime or government/agency money market mutual fund (MMF), respectively, in millions of
dollars. In column (2), the dependent variable is the total market value of repo cash lending by an individual
MMF that is backed by agency securities as collateral. In column (3), the dependent variable is the same
as in column (2), except receiving Treasury securities as collateral, and in column (4), it is repo backed
by all other types of collateral. In Panel C, I change the dependent variables to the total aggregate AUM
or repo lending across the entire MMF industry, and change the units to billions of dollars. The data is
obtained from monthly form N-MFP filings, the sample in this regression is November 2011 to July 2013.
The regressor is an indicator variable for the date being the last month of the quarter. Estimation is done
by OLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Prime MMFs (1) (2) (3) (4)
($ Million) Total Assets Agency Repo Treasury Repo Other Repo
Last Month -21.72 -192.7*** -142.4*** 4.769
of Quarter (426.5) (63.09) (37.29) (131.9)
Constant 6,999*** 1,052*** 504.0*** 1,211***
(251.1) (40.30) (27.95) (75.71)
Observations 6,313 3,979 2,779 1,791
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000
Panel B: Govt/Agency MMFs
($ Million) Total Assets Agency Repo Treasury Repo Other Repo
Last Month 115.1 -22.77 -185.0** 112.8
of Quarter (380.6) (232.0) (73.44) (316.3)
Constant 4,817*** 2,233*** 805.7*** 560.3***
(220.0) (135.5) (51.63) (193.1)
Observations 2,653 1,704 1,389 119
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001
Panel C: Total MMF Industry
($ Billion) Total Industry AUM Agency Repo Treasury Repo Other Repo
Last Month -22.80 -35.83*** -25.64*** -1.384
of Quarter (19.92) (10.96) (6.173) (5.685)
Constant 2,214*** 307.5*** 96.06*** 84.28***
(12.90) (7.650) (4.087) (3.258)
Observations 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.038 0.229 0.337 0.002
Source: SEC Form N-MFP
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Table 1.9.
MMF Cash Surplus at the End of the Quarter
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are the percent of an individual money market mutual
fund’s (MMF’s) assets under management (AUM) that is held in uninvested cash at the end of the month,
and the value of an individual MMF’s uninvested cash in millions of dollars, respectively. Uninvested cash
is calculated as the remainder of an MMF’s AUM after subtracting the value of all securities in an MMF’s
portfolio. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variables are aggregate AUM at the end of the month
and aggregate uninvested cash holdings at the end of the month, respectively, for all MMFs in an industry
classification (prime or govt/agency). Both (3) and (4) report in billions of dollars. Panel A reports results
among all prime MMFs, and Panel B repeats the exercise for all government/agency MMFs. The data is
obtained from monthly form N-MFP filings; the sample in this regression is November 2011 to July 2013.
The regressor is an indicator variable for the date being the last month of the quarter. Estimation is done
by OLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Prime MMFs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% of AUM Held Cash Holdings Aggregate AUM Aggregate Cash
as Cash ($ Millions) ($ Billions) Holdings ($ Billions)
Last Month of 0.00534*** 51.96*** -10.34 12.62***
Quarter (0.00191) (8.805) (24.92) (3.941)
Constant 0.00217* -38.69*** 1,701*** -9.403***
(0.00111) (4.498) (15.73) (2.676)
Observations 6,339 6,313 26 26
R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.270
Panel B: Govt/Agency MMFs
% of AUM Held Cash Holdings Aggregate AUM Aggregate Cash
as Cash ($ Millions) ($ Billions) Holdings ($ Billions)
Last Month of 0.0101*** 70.48*** 10.63 7.188***
Quarter (0.00283) (12.53) (9.045) (1.831)
Constant -0.00116 -33.89*** 491.9*** -3.461***
(0.00154) (5.744) (5.070) (.8366)
Observations 2,659 2,653 26 26
R-squared 0.005 0.014 0.057 0.441
Source: SEC Form N-MFP
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1.4.3 Dealer Leverage Explains Non-U.S. Bank Dealer Repo Quarter-
End Declines
Earlier tests in this paper showed no evidence to support a cash supply-driven effect, but
here I do find evidence consistent with a cash demand-driven effect. Among the differences
across capital regulation regimes in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, the most relevant aspect for
this study is the reporting requirement. U.S. banks are required to report capital ratios for
the last day of the quarter as well as an average across all days of the quarter. In contrast,
non-U.S. banks can simply report for the last day of the quarter. Therefore, U.S. banks
have very little incentive to window-dress their balance sheet at the end of the quarter—it
will not affect their capital requirements any more than a deviation any other time in the
quarter would. If this is indeed what’s driving the difference I observe between U.S. and
non-U.S. bank dealers, I would expect more levered non-U.S. bank dealers to be more likely
to window-dress.
I link the tri-party repo holdings for each bank dealer to that bank’s quarterly balance
sheet, using data obtained from BankScope. One limitation of BankScope is that it does not
contain data on all banks, especially Japanese banks. However, for the U.S. and Europe, I
am able to link almost all dealers to their banks. In Table 10, I test a fixed-effects regression
model for each region, where I supplement my end-of-quarter indicator variables with the
linked bank balance sheet for the previous quarter. To specifically test whether highly levered
banks are reducing their dealers’ repo borrowing at the end of the quarter to report lower
leverage, I interact the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio from the previous quarter with an indicator
for the last day of the current quarter. A higher Tier 1 capital ratio means less leverage, so
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if window dressing is driving repo declines, this regression coefficient must be positive. The
first row of column (3) shows that for European bank dealers, this coefficient is positive and
significant, suggesting window dressing incentives do explain their repo borrowing. Moreover,
the same coefficient for U.S. bank dealers in column (2) is insignificant and actually negative,
just as we would expect given their quarter-average reporting requirement. Therefore, this
cross-region test seems to confirm that the difference between U.S. and European bank dealer
behavior is explained by window dressing.
1.4.4 Joint Model Test
Thus far, in looking at cash suppliers and cash demanders separately, evidence rejects a
supply shift and favors a demand shift. However, to confirm this result, I use a proxy for
the price of repo borrowing (the sum of the haircut and the repo rate) in each asset class.
With this dealer-specific measure of the price of repo, I can test both quantity and price at
the end of the quarter, to determine whether the dominant effect is from cash demand or
supply. I will then present a simple model of repo supply and demand and jointly estimate
the two in a three-stage least squares specification with endogenous price.
Because the cost of borrowing in repo is dealer-specific as well as asset class-specific, I
test quarter-end effects in quantity and price of repo by each dealer, in each of their collateral
types. I control for variation between dealers and between asset types by adding fixed effects
for each quarter, dealer, and asset class in Table 11. Column (4) shows that while non-U.S.
bank dealers do less repo at the end of the quarter, the cost to borrow does not rise at all—in
fact, the coefficient is slightly negative.11
11In contrast, U.S. bank dealers do not window-dress, and their borrowing cost even rises slightly (and
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Table 1.10.
Repo Borrowing by a Dealer
The dependent variable is the daily market value of collateral pledged in repo by an individual dealer. In
column (1), the sample includes all dealers in U.S. tri-party repo, in columns (2) to (4), I reduce the sample
to dealer subsidiaries of U.S. banks, European banks, and Japanese banks, respectively. Regressors include
end-of-quarter reported Tier 1 capital ratio (as percent, not decimal, i.e., 12 not .12), and the total value
in billions of dollars of derivatives and of total assets for the dealer’s parent bank the prior quarter. These
regressors are also interacted with an indicator variable for the last day of the current quarter (“Quarter-end”).
I also include time dummies for the days preceding a quarter- or month-end, as well as the days following a
new quarter; however, they are not reported due to page constraints but available upon request. Quarterly
balance sheet data is obtained from Bankscope and covers most U.S. and European banks. However, it does
not cover enough Japanese banks to report the full empirical specification in column (4). Estimation is based
on OLS regression with time-fixed effects for each quarter in the sample period. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Repo Borrowing by a Dealer All Dealers U.S. Bank European Japanese Bank
($ Millions) Dealers Bank Dealers Dealers
Quarter-end x Tier 1 Ratio 682.0*** -852.2 755.1** -504.9
(264.7) (667.9) (323.7) (353.5)
Quarter-end x Derivatives -13.44*** 191.6*** -8.061*** -19.58
Outstanding($ Billions) (2.803) (70.40) (2.892) (27.89)
Quarter-end x Total Assets 0.602 -3.068** -0.659 3.990*
($ Billions) (0.560) (1.491) (1.114) (2.217)
Tier 1 Ratio 15.96 70.27** 8.748 –
(15.01) (32.02) (21.57)
Total Quarter-End Dealer 0.219* 1.790 0.233 –
Derivatives Outstanding($ Billions) (0.132) (3.643) (0.142)
Total Quarter-End Assets 0.0821** 0.104 0.125*** –
($ Billions) (0.0367) (0.102) (0.0442)
1-Day Lagged Repo 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.927***
Borrowing ($ Millions) (0.000709) (0.00101) (0.00120) (0.0156)
Last Day of a Quarter -8,462*** 10,844 -10,315** -2,021
(3,072) (8,571) (4,110) (3,679)
First Day of a Quarter 2,745*** -1,978*** 5,971*** 4,102***
(477.9) (699.2) (867.3) (694.9)
Last Day of a Month That Isn’t 339.6 1,189*** -112.2 -235.0
a Quarter-End (237.1) (227.7) (326.6) (200.1)
Constant -168.9 -879.7** -114.9 2,486***
(178.1) (440.0) (227.8) (552.7)
Observations 22,256 7,308 11,781 1,251
R-squared 0.996 0.997 0.995 0.885
Source: BankScope and Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Table 1.11.
Estimating Repo Quantity and Price Separately
In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the daily market value of collateral pledged in repo by a
single dealer, using a single class of collateral, in millions of dollars. In columns (2) and (4), the dependent
variable is the daily cost of borrowing, which I calculate as the ratio minus 1 of the market value of collateral
pledged in repo by a single dealer, using a single class of collateral, over the value of cash received in repo
by that dealer using that collateral, times 100. The regressors include the cost of borrowing and the prior
day’s total market value of collateral pledged in repo by that dealer using that collateral for columns (1)
and (3), and in columns (2) and (4), they instead include the prior day’s cost of borrowing and the current
day’s total market vlaue of collateral pledged in repo by that dealer using that collateral type. Regressors
also include indicator variables for the 5 business days before and after the turn of a quarter, as well as the
day before and after the start of a month that isn’t the end or start of a quarter. I do not report results for
the indicators 2–5 days around the turn of a quarter; however, they are available upon request. Columns
(1) and (2) use the sample of dealer subsidiaries of U.S. banks, and columns (3) and (4) use the sample
of dealer subsidiaries of non-U.S. banks. Estimation is based on OLS regression with time-fixed effects for
each quarter, dealer, and collateral asset class. Bootstrapped heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(Fixed Effects (1) (2) (3) (4)
by Each Quarter, U.S. Bank U.S. Bank Non-U.S. Bank Non-U.S. (%)
Dealer & Repo Borrowing Haircut (%) Repo Borrowing Bank
Asset Class) ($ Millions) ($ Millions) Haircut (%)
Haircut (%) -24.80*** -13.46***
(3.186) (2.444)
Yesterday’s Repo 0.963*** 0.983***
Borrowing ($ Millions) (0.00410) (0.00166)
Repo Borrowing -6.66e-06*** -3.35e-06***
($ Millions) (1.39e-06) (4.59e-07)
(2.93e-06) (7.71e-07)
Yesterday’s Haircut 0.794*** 0.931***
(0.0445) (0.00885)
Last Day of a Quarter 70.66 0.0423* -527.0*** -0.00871
(93.00) (0.0247) (67.75) (0.0159)
First day of a Quarter 3.236 0.0502* 644.7*** -0.0121
(72.58) (0.0281) (69.52) (0.0128)
Last Day of a Month That 87.53*** 0.00297 -13.46 -0.00846
Isn’t a Quarter-End (28.20) (0.0207) (27.05) (0.00769)
First Day of a Month that -56.06* 0.00853 136.2*** -0.0155
Isn’t the Start of a Quarter (29.54) (0.0154) (27.64) (0.0102)
Constant 470.0*** 1.05*** 188.8*** 0.305***
(48.09) (0.225) (19.34) (0.0385)
Observations 115,044 115,043 157,517 157,512
R-squared 0.927 0.636 0.968 0.875
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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As a further test of window dressing versus other explanations, I consider a joint model
of cash supply and demand where price is endogenous. Cash suppliers are driven by the
needs of their investors; they will invest in repo when they have inflows, but they might view
dealers from different regions as more or less risky (especially given reports by Chernenko
and Sunderam (2014) that money fund investors responded to the European sovereign debt
crisis in 2011 by reducing their exposure to European banks).
Cash demanders finance their portfolio in repo, based on the size of their total assets,
their risk propensity (measured by their use of derivatives), and their leverage. At the end
of the quarter, high leverage may incentivize window dressing to mask risk. The price of
repo borrowing is endogenously determined, to equate supply and demand so that markets
clear. To capture quarter-end effects, I again interact each term with a quarter-end indicator.
Table 11 reports the results of simultaneously estimating supply and demand in each dealer
and asset class, and again the results are consistent with window dressing.
For both U.S. and non-U.S. bank dealers, price and demand are negatively correlated:
a decrease in the price of borrowing leads to more demand for repo, as we would expect.
However, for non-U.S. dealers this effect is reversed on the last day of the quarter: a lower
cost of borrowing correlates with a larger quarter-end decline in repo. This agrees with our
earlier finding: window dressing is concentrated in safe assets, which are already cheaper
to finance in repo, but likewise cheaper to liquidate for deleveraging purposes. Therefore,
declines in repo borrowing appear to be explained by non-U.S. bank dealers’ window-dressing
their balance sheets in a form of regulatory arbitrage.
there is no reversal at the start of the new quarter).
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Table 1.12.
3SLS Demand and Supply Simultaneously Estimated
In each column, the dependent variable is the total daily repo borrowing by a single dealer in a single class
of collateral. In columns (1), (3), and (5), this is modeled as demand, while in columns (2), (4), and (6) this
is modeled as supply. The regressors include the cost of borrowing and the prior day’s total market value of
collateral pledged in repo by that dealer using that collateral, as well as dummies for the last day of a quarter
and a month. In the demand estimations, I include the bank balance sheet measures from Table 10. In the
supply estimations, I include money market fund assets under management (AUM) measures from Table 7.
Estimation is based on 3SLS regression with time fixed effects for each quarter, dealer, and collateral asset
class. Bootstrapped heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregate Aggregate U.S. Bank Supply European Bank Supply
Demand Supply Demand Demand
Yesterday’s Repo 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.991*** 0.997*** 0.998*** 0.995***
Borrowing (0.000429) (0.000345) (0.000981) (0.000474) (0.000578) (0.000592)
Haircut (not %) 2.410e+09*** 1.115e+09** -7.228e+09*** 1.723e+09** 5.558e+09*** -2.765e+08
(6.925e+08) (5.677e+08) (1.479e+09) (6.728e+08) (9.007e+08) (9.764e+08)
Haircut x Last Day 301.1e+09*** 301.2e+09*** -634.5e+09*** -634.3e+09*** 650.2e+09*** 650.2e+09***
Of the Quarter (709.0e+08) (709.5e+08) (135.4e+09) (135.4e+09) (946.9e+08) (947.5e+08)
Last Day of the -2.700e+08*** -2.898e+08*** 6.413e+08*** 7.632e+08** -8.259e+08*** -9.691e+08***
Quarter (4.436e+07) (6.094e+07) (1.671e+08) (3.872e+08) (8.561e+07) (1.153e+08)
Last Day of a Month 3.188e+07* 3.139e+07* 1.341e+08*** 1.364e+08*** -2.873e+07 -3.131e+07
That Isn’t Quarter-end (1.822e+07) (1.821e+07) (2.961e+07) (2.917e+07) (2.854e+07) (2.823e+07)
Bank’s Tier 1 Ratio -3.183e+06 3.056e+07*** -8.626e+06***
(%) (2.279e+06) (5.669e+06) (2.108e+06)
Tier 1 Ratio x Last Day 2.760e+06 -2.163e+07** 7.896e+06**
of the Quarter (2.007e+06) (1.085e+07) (3.512e+06)
Dealer’s Assets -0.00918 0.0140*** -0.0543***
($Thousand) (0.00657) (0.00478) (0.0132)
Dealer’s Assets x Last 0.00752 -0.00431 0.0519***
Day of the Quarter (0.00571) (0.0342) (0.0173)
Derivatives Holdings 0.000939 2.000*** -0.000315
($Thousand) (0.000885) (0.379) (0.00250)
Derivatives x Last -0.00237 -1.013 -0.0117
Day of the Quarter (0.00491) (0.927) (0.0202)
Total MMF 26.70 -169.3 108.1
AUM ($Million) (25.77) (163.1) (86.44)
Yesterday’s -36.73 114.4 -161.9*
MMF AUM (31.31) (161.2) (90.33)
MMF AUM, Last 6.738 -39.12 44.16
Day of the Quarter (9.160) (162.8) (28.98)
Constant -1.630e+07 1.031e+07 -1.243e+08*** 6.855e+07 1.561e+07 1.982e+08***
(2.557e+07) (4.043e+07) (4.336e+07) (6.141e+07) (3.928e+07) (7.594e+07)
Observations 179,851 179,851 63,399 63,399 93,410 93,410
R-squared 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.991 0.991
Source: Bankscope, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and SEC Form N-MFP
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1.4.5 Identification Using the Dealer-Lender Network
One limitation of my analysis so far is that it still suffers from the potential for omitted
variable bias. Non-U.S. bank dealers may be borrowing from a different set of lenders than
U.S. bank dealers, and those lenders may face different shocks at the end of the quarter.
To control for any other potential cash lender effects, I use an additional data set on the
network of tri-party repo lending since 2011. Similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008), I can use
the network to examine the quarter-end effect within a cash lender using both lender and
time-fixed effects. Table 13 reports that within a single lender, quarter-end repo borrowing
by European bank dealers drops 13.6%, while U.S. and Japanese bank dealer borrowing is
not significantly affected.
In a further test, I use a subset of the dealer-investor network that allows me to
identify price effects in the haircut and the repo rate separately. Since November 2010,
money market funds have published complete end-of-month portfolio holdings, including all
repurchase transactions and the haircut and rate applied on the underlying collateral12. To
fully identify price and quantity effects, I collect and use this data on the sub-network of
tri-party repo transactions where money market funds are the cash investor. Table 14 shows
that while money funds lend less to European dealers at quarter-end, repo rates drop at
quarter-end for both U.S. and European bank borrowers and haircuts are not significantly
affected for any participants. This drop in both quantity (for European banks) and in market
price (via the repo rate) is consistent with a shock to cash demand rather than cash supply,
12A recent paper by Hu, Pan, and Wang (2014) uses this N-MFP filing data to conduct an extensive survey
of tri-party repo pricing practices, and is the only other paper I am aware of which takes advantage of this
pricing data.
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Table 1.13. Within-Lender Variation in Repo Lending
The dependent variable is the natural log of the daily total market value of collateral pledged in repo by
an individual dealer to an individual repo cash lender. The regressors are the natural log of the prior day’s
total market value of collateral pledged, as well as indicator variables for the last business day of a quarter
and month, the country of origin of a dealer’s parent bank, and the interaction of those terms. Estimation
is based on OLS regression with lender-time-fixed effects for each quarter in the sample period, for each
cash lender in the sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by lender are presented in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
log(Total Repo) log(Total Repo)
Yesterday’s log(Total Repo) 0.991*** 0.991***
(0.000386) (0.000379)
Last Day of a Quarter 0.000184 0.000324
(0.0324) (0.0324)
Europe Quarter-End -0.136*** -0.137***
(0.0182) (0.0182)
Japan Quarter-End -0.0281 -0.0287
(0.0185) (0.0185)
U.S. Quarter-End -0.00876 -0.00782
(0.0157) (0.0157)
Last Day of a Month That -0.0668

















Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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which supports window dressing as the likely explanation for the quarter-end repo anomaly.
1.5 Robustness Tests
1.5.1 Unit Root
If repo borrowing follows a unit root process, this might lead to a problem of spurious
regression. I test for unit roots in the quantity of repo borrowing using an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test allowing for drift in the series and find rejection of that hypothesis. Because I am
also testing repo borrowing at the dealer level, I further test for unit roots across the panel
using a Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and again reject the null hypothesis that
repo borrowing is a unit root process.
If repo borrowing is not a unit root process but is actually near unit root, my tests for
a unit root would suffer from reduced power. Therefore, I also test for window dressing using
changes in logs rather than an AR(1) specification. Again, I find a significant quarter-end
drop and subsequent rebound in repo borrowing for non-U.S. banks, which is concentrated
in highly levered banks and in repo backed by safe, liquid collateral.
1.5.2 Panel VAR
I chose to use simultaneous equations for my main empirical strategy because quarter-ends
obviously arrive exogenously. However, to test the identification of my model of supply and
demand, I used a vector auto-regression (VAR) approach. Because tri-party repo haircuts
are dealer– and collateral-specific, I run a panel VAR at the dealer and asset-class level.
Standard model selection technique (AIC) suggests I use 1-period lags. My panel VAR
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Table 1.14. Within-Investor Identification Using Pricing Data
In column (1), the dependent variable is the natural log of the total market value of collateral pledged in
repo by an individual dealer to an individual money market fund on the last day of a month. In columns (2)
and (3), the dependent variables are the average repo rate and haircut, respectively, charged to a dealer by a
money market fund on the last day of a month. The regressors are indicators for the last day of a quarter, as
well as the last day of a quarter interacted with indicators for whether the repo borrower belongs to a bank
from the U.S., Europe, or Japan, respectively. Additionally, the natural log of a money market fund’s assets
under management (AUM) is added as a regressor, and in columns (1) to (3), a 1-period lag term of the
dependent variable is also added. Estimation is based on OLS regression with lender-time-fixed effects for
each quarter in the sample period, for each cash lender in the sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by lender are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ln(Repo Lending) Repo Rate Haircut
Quarter-End -0.0594*** -0.0223*** 0.0345
(0.0228) (0.00231) (0.0239)
U.S.×Quarter-End 0.0305 -0.00627*** -0.0158
(0.0280) (0.00198) (0.0197)
Europe×Quarter-End -0.168*** -0.00574*** 0.0299
(0.0253) (0.00175) (0.0567)
Japan×Quarter-End 0.0267 0.0143*** -0.0180
(0.0585) (0.00390) (0.0183)








Constant 6.499*** 0.0341*** 0.0624***
(0.191) (0.00234) (0.0130)
Observations 48,036 48,036 48,036
R-squared 0.427 0.743 0.411
Source: SEC Form N-MFP
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results are still consistent with window dressing: dealer leverage predicts significantly lower
quarter-end repo borrowing, although I do not retain significance on other balance sheet
measures.
1.5.3 U.S. Bank Holding Company Data
Other researchers have used data on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) to find evidence of
window dressing by U.S. banks. This is inconsistent with my results using the tri-party repo
data, in which I find that window dressing was concentrated in highly leveraged non-U.S.
BHCs. The most compelling results are from Owens and Wu (2012), who use public reports
filed by BHCs in form Y-9C. These reports include the quarter-average and quarter-end
balance sheet data of these banks, and those authors take the discrepancy between those
two measures as evidence of window dressing. To test their result, I repeat their analysis
using Y-9C data from 2001 through 2013, which I obtain through WRDS. Column (1) of
Table 15 reports similar findings to their Table (4) Column (1): window dressing is indeed
concentrated among BHCs with high leverage.
In Columns (2) and (3), I divide the sample into BHCs that are U.S.-based, and
those bank holding companies that are subsidiaries of a non-U.S. parent.13 The effect of
leverage is entirely concentrated in the few non-U.S. BHCs, and the size effect is quite nearly
captured by non-U.S. BHCs as well. Additions to loan loss reserves during the prior quarter
are intended to account for non-window dressing pressures to de-leverage, and this effect
remains for the U.S. BHCs but not the non-U.S. BHCs. These results are consistent with
13I also impose the same requirement as Owens and Wu (2012) that these bank holding companies have
total consolidated assets greater than $500 million.
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my findings in tri-party repo: non-U.S. bank holding companies window-dress and thereby
improve the appearance of their parents’ own financial statements.
Table 1.15.
Quarterly Changes in Repo and Fed Funds Liabilities By Country
The dependent variable is the measure of window dressing of repo and fed funds liabilities proposed by Owens
and Wu (2012) for an individual bank holding company (BHC). The regressors are also those proposed by the
same paper. These are the prior quarter’s average leverage for the BHC; the natural logarithm of quarterly
average total assets; an indicator variable that = 1 if quarter t ended between 2007 Q4 and 2009 Q2, inclusive,
and 0 otherwise; and the loan loss provision as a percentage of gross loans for the prior quarter. Column (1)
estimates using the entire sample of BHCs that report in form Y-9C and have total assets greater than $500
million, columns (2) and (3) reduce that sample to those BHCs whose ultimate parent is either in the U.S.
or not in the U.S., respectively. Estimation is based on OLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Owens & Wu (2012) (1) (2) (3)
Window Dressing Measure All BHCs U.S. BHCs non-U.S. BHCs
Quarter-Average Leveraget−1 -3.92e-05*** -4.26e-06 -3.68e-05***
(4.56e-06) (7.97e-06) (8.28e-06)
ln(Size)t−1 -0.000829*** -0.000301* -0.0110***
(0.000160) (0.000163) (0.00137)
Crisis Period 0.000385 0.000492 -0.00533
(0.000579) (0.000576) (0.00792)
LLRt−1 -0.139*** -0.141*** 0.0963
(0.00865) (0.00860) (0.130)
Constant 0.0128*** 0.00494** 0.169***
(0.00230) (0.00235) (0.0229)
Observations 18,306 18,118 188
R-squared 0.019 0.015 0.369
Source: Federal Reserve Form Y-9C
1.6 Spillover Effects from Window Dressing
1.6.1 Agency Bond Markets
Repurchase agreements give cash in exchange for collateral, and when a dealer decides not
to repo an asset, they must either find alternative financing or sell the asset. Repo window
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dressing is concentrated in safe assets: Treasuries, agency MBS and agency bonds, and
money market assets (e.g., CDs). Since March 2010, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) has collected data on all agency bond transactions involving dealers,
and made them available to researchers through WRDS.14 In this subsection, I use this
data, including the price, quantity, time of execution and settlement, and direction (dealer-
to-dealer or dealer buying/selling to a non-dealer) of each trade, to examine the impact of
dealer window dressing on market quality for agency bonds.
When looking across markets, it’s important to control for differences in the settlement
process of each security. Repurchase agreements are “T+0” transactions, meaning that cash
and securities are exchanged on the same day as the trade is executed. Agency bonds typi-
cally settle on “T+1,” meaning the next business day after execution. If a dealer chooses not
to finance his or her securities in repo anymore on a given day, he or she will still need to
return cash to repurchase their securities that same day. Therefore, from the dealer’s per-
spective, cash timing across markets is strategically important for window dressing. TRACE
includes data on settlement as well, so to compare bonds and repo, I adjust each trade in
Agency TRACE to the date of cash settlement. For the remainder of this paper, I will call
the time of a trade the date of its settlement instead of its execution.
Table 16 shows that in the days preceding a quarter-end, dealers are on net, selling
heavily to non-dealers (giving up assets for cash). However, once the new quarter starts,
dealers are immediately relevering by buying back agency bonds. In the inter-dealer network,
Column (2) reports that inter-dealer trading rises to three times normal levels at the end
14I am unable to locate high-frequency data on Treasury transactions, and in a follow-up extension to
this paper, I am currently processing data from FINRA’s new TRACE dataset of agency MBS transactions,
which are not included in this paper.
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of the quarter, and then collapses once the new quarter begins.15 As a whole, the dealer
system is therefore delevering at the end of the quarter through sales to customers and
then relevering once the new quarter starts, consistent with window dressing. Moreover,
even if market participants understand and anticipate this behavior, it is in practice very
similar to Lehman’s repo 105 transactions, just executed through bond markets rather than
mistreatment of repo accounting.
Furthermore, if dealers are deleveraging through the bond markets, we should expect
an impact on market quality as measured by price impact. Froot and Stein (1998) predict
that when capital constraints bind, intermediaries will offer worse prices to customers in
transactions that increase their capital burden, and better prices for transactions that re-
duce their capital burden. Indeed, Naik and Yadav (2003) find that when market demand
for securities brings dealers’ positions closer to intraday capital limits, customers face signif-
icantly asymmetric effects on market quality. Window dressing is a self-imposed constraint
on dealer leverage, which is only necessary at the end of the quarter, so the prediction of
Froot and Stein (1998) should therefore extend to a seasonal effect on market quality.
I compute the daily percent price change of each bond, as a function of the net dealer
buying minus selling on that bond each day. However, individual bonds can trade very
infrequently, so I look only at price changes when the bond has traded at least once that
day and the day before. Dealers act as market makers in agency bonds, so typically a trade
between a dealer and a customer is customer-initiated. Therefore, I expect a dealer buying
from a customer to have a negative price impact. Indeed, Table 17 shows this is the case
15This may be due to window-dressing dealers seeking out less-levered dealers, and in a follow-up project,




Quarter-End Dealer Selling Pressure
The dependent variable is the settlement-adjusted daily total market volume in millions of dollars of dealer
purchases from customers minus dealer sales to customers (column (1)), or of trades between two dealers
(column (2)), in which the security was an agency bond. Regressors are indicator variables for the five days
before and after a change in quarter. Data is obtained from WRDS TRACE. Each transaction is considered
at the date of settlement rather than execution. Estimation is based on OLS regression. Bootstrapped
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Agency Bonds (1) (2)
Daily Market Volume ($ Millions) Net Dealer Buying Inter-Dealer Trading
Fifth-to-Last Day of -253.1* 3,708
Quarter (146.4) (13,840)
Fourth-to-Last Day of -598.8** 22,810***
Quarter (236.1) (8,487)
Third-to-Last Day of -1,294*** 80,000***
Quarter (259.7) (25,610)
Second-to-Last Day -1,520*** 108,100**
of Quarter (425.5) (43,220)
Last Day of Quarter -1,534*** 129,000**
(556.6) (63,860)
First Day of Quarter 408.2** -19,070
(191.5) (14,940)
Second Day of 366.7** -30,890***
Quarter (172.4) (8,940)
Third Day of Quarter 427.2*** -17,550
(98.96) (16,750)
Fourth Day of Quarter 97.41 -16,260**
(144.5) (6,358)








during normal times. However, in the five days before the end of the quarter, when dealers
are selling heavily to customers, the price impact of selling to a dealer rises by 12%. Once
the new quarter starts, the price impact in selling to a dealer decreases but is not significant.
This appears to be consistent with a quarterly drop in market quality due to dealer window
dressing.
Table 1.17.
Price Effects of Window Dressing Deleveraging Pressure
The dependent variable is the one-day percentage change in price of an Agency bond. Net directional volume
is the daily total value of bonds bought by dealers from customers minus the total value of bonds sold by
dealers to customers. This regressor is also interacted with pre- and post-quarter-end indicator variables
which =1 for all of the 5 days before or after the change in quarter, respectively. Estimation is based on OLS
regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1)
Percent Change in Price
Net Directional Volume -0.00731***
(0.000136)
Net Directional Volume x Pre-Quarter-End -0.000895*
(0.000513)







1.6.2 Money Market Mutual Funds
Agency bond markets see dealers selling assets for cash, but as shown earlier, money market
funds have a surplus of quarter-end cash. Due to regulatory restrictions, money market
funds cannot invest in long-dated securities such as agency bonds, so there is effectively a
47
dislocation of cash in the markets each quarter. Repo is a conduit for short-term money to
finance longer-term investments, and quarterly window dressing is a regular stress on this
conduit. Money market funds have had to play a quarterly game of musical chairs to find
short-term assets that they can roll out of when repo resumes at the start of the quarter. The
Federal Reserve’s reverse repurchase agreement program (RRP) was instituted in September
2013, and it appears to be facilitating this process.
In the current zero-interest-rate policy environment, the Fed funds market has become
relatively inactive,16 and the RRP was originally proposed as a new tool to impose a floor
in interest rates by raising the repo rate. To do this, the Federal Reserve will lend collateral
to cash suppliers (mostly money market funds), in essentially a tri-party repo transaction in
which the Fed is the dealer.
Each quarter, the Federal Reserve has increased the amount of collateral it is willing
to repo. Figure 5 shows that at the end of each quarter, cash from money funds surges
into the RRP and immediately flows back out. On September 19, 2014, the Federal Reserve
announced17 (perhaps in an effort to make money funds less reliant on the Federal Reserve
to help cope with window dressing) it would lower the cap on its reverse repo transactions
to $300 billion, which sent rates on ultra-low Treasury bills maturing October 2 below zero.
The RRP was intended to be a tool for raising interest rates by pulling cash out of the money
markets, but at the end of the quarter, it seems the RRP is being overwhelmed by window
dressing.




Figure 1.5. Daily Demand to Lend to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Notes: The vertical axis represents the value in billions of dollars of cash submitted in auction to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to finance collateral pledged by the FRBNY in an overnight repo
each day through its Reverse Repurchase (RRP) program. The program was first discussed in a July 2013
policy meeting, early testing began August 7, 2013, and this chart shows submissions each day from then
until October 15, 2014. Quarter-ends are marked with vertical dashed lines, and year-ends are marked with
heavier dash-dotted lines. Almost every day, the amount submitted in auction was then used that same day
to finance FRBNY collateral. The only exceptions to this are in mid-August 2013 when the program was
still being tested and was limited to $5 billion, and on September 30, 2014, when the FRBNY limited the
value of collateral it would pledge in repo to $300 billion.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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1.7 Conclusion
Non-U.S. bank dealers window-dress. The effect is not driven by cash lenders, and dealer
leverage explains the quarter-end decline in repo. A joint model of supply and demand shows
that non-U.S. dealers are voluntarily reducing their demand and do not face higher costs at
the end of the quarter as they would from reduced supply.
Window dressing understates a dealer bank’s leverage and maturity mismatch, which
means systemic risk is higher than we would believe using only quarter-end measures. Win-
dow dressing also creates spillovers into other markets, and dislocates cash from productive
financial intermediation. Other agents can take advantage of this phenomenon: the end of
the quarter is a very good time for bond funds to buy from dealers, although the round trip
costs of trading with a dealer do not appear to allow an arbitrage-like opportunity. Morey
and O’Neal (2006) find that bond mutual funds window-dress as well, by buying govern-
ment bonds before disclosure; bank window dressing and bond fund window dressing may
be complementary to each other.
This raises interesting implications for previous studies of the repo market during the
financial crisis. Quantities (or prices) of repo borrowing cannot separately by themselves
demonstrate a run on dealers. To really determine what’s happening in repo, we need an
integrated approach to looking at supply, demand, and especially at deleveraging pressures.
In quarter-end window dressing, the effect is dealer-initiated. It is not clear whether the
haircut spirals documented in Gorton and Metrick (2009) were driven by dealers unwilling
to lend to hedge funds, or whether the dealers themselves were being forced to delever and
wind down their repo operations. By collecting more data on bilateral repo transactions as
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well as investment flows from securities lending and segregated accounts, we may be able
to better answer whether the 2008 crisis was a run on repo or whether repo behavior was
simply a symptom of a deleveraging banking system.
My findings offer some clear policy recommendations as well. As part of the Basel III
bank capital reforms, a new supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) is currently being imple-
mented. U.S. regulators have announced they intend to calculate the SLR from the daily
quarter average. However, outside the U.S., the SLR’s current implementation will calculate
the ratio from the average of the last day of each month in a quarter. Because non-U.S. banks
are currently window dressing at the end of each quarter, it is very likely that a change to
using month-ends for capital regulation will simply increase the frequency of window dress-
ing, with commensurate challenges for money market funds and other repo lenders. In other
words, the frequency of reporting a regulatory ratio may matter as much as the required
level of the ratio itself. Of course, Tier 1 and other regulatory ratios would also be more
informative outside the U.S. if foreign banks switched to a quarter-average calculation as
well.
SLR should be quarter-average, all capital requirements should be quarter-average.
Fitch Ratings has claimed that making SLR a daily average instead of month-end average
represents a concession to U.S. custodian banks.18 However, this paper suggests that the
opposite is true. Daily averaging of capital requirements disincentivizes window dressing,
which improves the effectiveness of bank regulation.
Lehman Brothers was excoriated for their window dressing through Repo 105 and Repo
108, but many dealers are doing a very similar thing. In fact, because most dealers were
18Custodian banks are typically cash-rich banks, as opposed to most cash-poor dealer banks. https:
//www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/US-Leverage-Rule .
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window dressing by cutting repo, Lehman might have had an easier time putting $50 billion
into repo, because cash lenders had a surplus and no one else to lend to.
The RRP appears to be absorbing significant cash each quarter-end that arrives due
to window dressing. The RRP was intended to be a tool for increasing interest rates as
an alternative to fed funds.19 However, the September 17, 2014, announcement capping
the RRP at $300 billion sent money market investors scrambling for alternative short-term
investments for their anticipated excess cash from repo, and dropped yields on short-term
Treasury bills into negative territory. By providing cash lenders with a safe repo counterparty
when others window-dress, the Federal Reserve may be making those lenders dependent on
the RRP at quarter-ends. If window dressing is not fixed, the Fed can at least modify the
RRP to make it flexible during the quarter, increasing the amount of collateral financed at
quarter-end to absorb the surge in cash, but then lowering it during the quarter to match
the decrease in uninvested cash. The recent addition of term repurchase agreements to the
RRP is likely effective in ameliorating this problem.
19http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/rrp_faq.html .
52
Chapter 2: Capital and Bank Runs
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 demonstrated the fragility of financial intermediation.
Specifically, when long-term investments are financed by short-term funding there is rollover
risk. Banks face a trade-off between providing a liquid investment to a pool of depositors who
have a temporary cash surplus, and facing a run when depositors simultaneously demand
that liquidity. Similar funding arrangements exist in repo lending and money market mutual
funds. The sudden contraction in available liquidity after a run is generally considered to
impose significant externalities on the economy. This is sometimes referred to as the “real
effect” of a financial crisis–the bankruptcies and layoffs and disinvestments that companies
may have to undergo due to a lack of appropriate financing.
History shows that when runs spread to the entire banking system they have jolted
populations into enacting sweeping reforms in an attempt to prevent the danger from re-
curring. The 1907 financial panic brought us the Federal Reserve, the bank runs across the
US in the 1930s brought the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (among many other re-
forms), and the 2007-2008 crisis brought the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the formation
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, and an upgrade of the Basel Capital Accords.
The full impact of these measures is very difficult to judge–as evidenced by the plethora of
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proposed metrics for measuring “systemic risk” that have been put forward since the recent
financial crisis. This paper hopes to bring some further understanding to the debate about
bank regulation by extending traditional bank run models to allow endogenous portfolio se-
lection by the bank. I create a class of investors who provide bank equity and explore bank
capital’s role in mitigating or preventing bank runs. The model presented here will show
two effects of bank capital. First, capital provides a limited form of deposit insurance to
depositors, thus increasing the severity of a credit event needed to make informed depositors
run. Second, it disciplines the bank’s choice of portfolio portfolio risk, since shareholders
must internalize depositor run risk. Bank capital structure therefore affects the degree of
liquidity risk- and portfolio risk-sharing in the economy. I then use this model to analyze the
social welfare trade-offs between depositors and shareholders due to a change in the bank
capital ratio.
Literature Review
The literature on bank runs is extensive and multifaceted. Bryant (1980) investigated bank
runs in the context of heterogeneous agents as well as asymmetric information. Certain
agents knew they were “early diers” and engaged in utility-increasing wealth transfers with
other agents. However, this early take on liquidity insurance would result in “runs” if some de-
positors received early information about the likelihood of some uninsurable event occurring.
Diamond & Dybvig (1983) present a model where agents are instead ex ante homogeneous,
but they each face an i.i.d. liquidity shock λ, which forces them to consume before the
investment technology can bear fruit. In this model, they show that “sunspot” equilibria
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can arise, where both running and not running are equilibrium outcomes, since depositors
are neither able to commit to an action nor to coordinate their actions with each other to
ensure a unique equilibrium. This lack of a unique equilibrum has been used as a rationale
for the existence of bank deposit insurance, whereby the sovereign is able to credibly commit
to a policy of redeeming all deposits even if the bank collapses, and thereby prevent the run
outcome.
Jacklin & Bhattacharya (1988) consider the use of peer inference in a run. Agents
may get a signal about the bank’s prospects, and they may also observe their fellow agents
queueing up to withdraw from the bank. This observation may inform the agent’s own
signal, telling her that the bank must be insolvent because so many of her peers are already
lining up, so therefore she too will line up to withdraw. The cascading effect of this peer
inference results in the entire depositor base choosing to run on the bank, even though the
agents’ own information might have indicated the bank was solvent. Therefore the authors
are able to distinguish between information-based and panic-based runs, and claim that an
institution should choose between funding by deposits or by equity depending on the risk
and information attributes of the underlying investment projects.
He & Xiong (2012) take a similar approach, but add the interesting feature that agents
hold short-term debt contracts rather than demand deposits, and agents anticipate their
peers’ decision to run by observing a public signal of bank fundamentals, rather than ob-
serving their peers’ decisions directly. This coordinates depositors into a pre-emptive run,
where the bank is unable to roll over part of its portfolio and therefore fails. They seek
to explain the behavior observed during the financial crisis where seemingly healthy banks
suddenly experienced runs by their creditors and required extensive government liquidity
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support, and their model indicates that even small changes in the volatility or liquidation
value of assets can trigger a run.
In contrast, Goldstein & Pauzner (2005) look at the simultaneous coordination of
depositors over independent private signals, and seek to determine the optimal level of
risk-sharing among agents. They find that a bank provides a worse level of risk-sharing
(parametrized by the deposit rate r1) than what a benevolent social planner could provide,
but ex ante utility is still higher than under autarky, so banks as institutions are social
welfare-improving. Their paper is of most direct impact to the current paper, which seeks
to extend the model framework developed by Goldstein & Pauzner (2005) to include bank
capital, and ask to what degree banks and bank regulatory policies (minimum bank capital
requirements, deposit insurance, and suspension of convertibility) are welfare improving.
Diamond (1984) considers a bank as the delegated monitor for a project, and finds
economic rents from the reduced duplication of monitoring activity, as well as the ability of
the bank to diversify its portfolio across more projects. From their analysis, they conclude
that the optimal capital structure of a bank is to have a very diversified porfolio backed
by deposits and very little capital. Diamond & Rajan (2000 & 2001) provide a further
rationale for bank deposit finance by the negotiating advantage it gives to the bank when
contracting with entrepreneurs: the bank cannot renegotiate and accept less payment from
the entrepreneur because if they were to do so, their depositors would run and force the bank
to call in the loan. Therefore, bank deposits serve as a commitment device that helps enforce
contracts. More broadly, they make the point that devices such as a bank that tie human
capital to assets create liquidity. Diamond & Rajan (2000) also seeks to explain the decline in
bank capital over 200 years due to the trade-off between creating liquidity (through issuing
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deposits as a commitment device on the bank manager) and robustness (through softer
claims like equity and long-term debt that can be renegotiated under negative shocks, but
allow the bank manager to capture some rents). They claim that due to generally increased
asset liquidity (in addition to implicit government capital in the form of deposit insurance
and regulatory oversight), banks naturally become more levered. However, the paper leaves
room for examining the social welfare implications of a more levered banking system in
the absence of the rent-extraction problem. Given the trend towards securitization and the
maturation of the parallel financial system (sometimes called “shadow banking”), investors
are able to replicate much of the bank’s contracting power through an asset-backed security
which is held in a conduit facility financed by commercial paper. The ease of setting up
such an institution, and the fluidity with which new forms of these contracts can be created
makes it more appealing to study the abstract security, setting aside assumptions about
relationship-specific negotiations.
Admati et al. (2010 and 2012) analyze the leverage decision of a bank, and address
several common flaws in arguments used to support the notion that equity is expensive for
banks. They find that equity requirements for banks could be set significantly higher than
they currently are and claim that such a shift would have large positive social benefits and
minimal, if any, costs. The authors suggest tha bank managers accrue benefits from high
bank leverage, at the expense of the general public as well as diversified shareholders, and
would rationally resist deleveraging. They use a model of debt overhang to show a dynamic
incentive to “ratchet” leverage up and not down, creating an “addiction” to leverage once
an exogenous portfolio and capital structure has been set. Our paper uses a very different
model to look instead at the ex ante incentives of risk-shifting in the presence of bank runs
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to analyze the social tradeoffs of changing capital requirements. As we will show later in this
paper, the risk of runs by depositors can discipline the bank’s risk-taking at different levels
of leverage, which critically affects optimal bank capital policy.
2.1 Model Setup
i) Agents
There are 3 periods in the model: t∈ (0, 1, 2), and two types of agents, having aggregate
t = 0 endowment 1 + e. All agents are born at time 0 and are endowed with one unit of
the consumption good. Consumption occurs only in period 1 and 2. Mass 1 of agents are
uncertain at t=0 about their true type–patient or impatient. Patient agents can consume at
either period, their utility is u (c1 + c2). Impatient agents can only consume at t = 1, their
utility is u (c1). Uncertain agents know that at t = 1 they will learn their type (as private
information), and with probablity λ, will be impatient. Uncertain agents’ types are i.i.d., so
at t = 1 mass λ will be impatient, (1− λ) will be patient. Meanwhile, the remaining mass
e of agents are certain–they know at t=0 that they are patient. I assume utility is twice
continuously differentiable, increasing, and for c ≥ 1 has relative risk-aversion greater than
1, as in Goldstein & Pauzner (2005). To simplify analysis of the model, we assume u (0) = 0
without loss of generality.
ii) Projects
At t=0, investments can be made in the productive technology, which gives a positive ex-
pected long-run return. There are I mutually exclusive possible projects which vary in risk
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and are only available to banks. A bank invests in project i ∈ I, which offers gross re-
turn Ri ≥ 1 if successful. At t = 1, any risky project can be liquidated to yield the same
exogenous recovery value γ. At t = 2, risky projects that weren’t liquidated can pay out
to investors. Let F̂i (·) denote the mean-shifted standard normal N (µi, 1) cumulative dis-
tribution function. With probability F̂i (θ) project i delivers Ri units of output, and with
probability 1− F̂i (θ) , the investment fails and delivers 0. Projects are fairly priced, meaning
for a certainly patient investor, E[u(investing in project i)] = u(R), ∀i ∈ I, and where R is
the risk-free rate1. The state of all investments’ prospects is captured by θ and is imperfectly
observed at t = 1, though investors know at t = 0 that θ is drawn from a standard normal
distribution N (0, 1)2. The riskless asset is available only to the bank, and without loss of
generality I assume it offers zero interest, i.e. R = 1.
ii) First Best Solution
In autarky, impatient agents will consume γ in period 1. Patient agents will liquidate early
and consume γ as well if signal θi is sufficiently bad (F̂i(θi)u(Ri) < u(γ)), otherwise they
will stay with their investment, wait until period 2, and consume Ri units in period 2 with
probability F̂i (θ). A benevolent social planner who could observe agents’ types (patient
or impatient) could improve uncertain agents’ ex ante overall welfare, by setting impatient
agents’ consumption c1. Namely, choosing c1 to maximize the ex ante expected utility of an




u (Ri) > u (γ), so for patient agents it is ex ante preferable
to let the investment mature at t = 2 rather than liquidate at t = 1.
2This particular distributional assumption is chosen to ensure that the state variable θ has unbounded
support, while the probability of any project’s success is still within [0, 1]
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agent:

















Then in good times when F̂i(θi)u(Ri) > u(γ), λc1 units of investment would be liquidated
early to satisfy impatient agents, and patient agents receive with probability F̂i (θ) an equal





invested in the productive technol-
ogy. In bad times, the entire project is liquidated early (efficient liquidation), but impatient
agents will still receive c1 while the rest of the liquidation value is prorated among the other
investors. Because uncertain agents are ex ante identical and indifferent over choice of Ri,
I assume they choose an arbitrary common risk level Ri. Thus we obtain a first-order con-
dition similar to (1) in Goldstein & Pauzner (2005) for the first-best promised c1,equating





































u (Ri) > u (γ) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1.
Therefore at the social planner’s Pareto optimum that c1 > γ, i.e. there is risk-sharing among
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the uncertain agents. The social planner is not able to Pareto-improve all agents’ expected
welfare by including certainly patient agents in this pooling scheme, because certainly patient
agents would face decreased utility from the partial liquidation of their portfolio with the
uncertain agents when liquidation is inefficient, and would never receive c1. Pareto optimality
is an important restriction on the first-best, because certainly patient agents would not
voluntarily participate in the risk-pooling that the social planner could offer. Therefore










 · prob(stay and success)
+




 · prob(liquidate early)
(2.3)
iii) Banks
When types are unobservable, the above contract offered by the social planner becomes unen-
forceable. Diamond & Dybvig showed that the demand-deposit contract can still effectively
allow for a co-insurance scheme among depositors, while Goldstein & Pauzner demonstrated
that the degree of risk-sharing would be less than the social planner’s first-best optimum.
This paper seeks to show how incorporating certainly patient agents as equity holders in the
bank contract affects the degree of risk-sharing and the optimal level of bank portfolio risk
(something the aforementioned papers did not have the structure to immediately consider).
The demand deposit contract is as follows: in exchange for a deposit of 1 unit at t = 0, the
bank promises a depositor a fixed payment r1 > γ if she chooses withdrawal at t = 1. If
the depositor chooses to wait until t = 2 to withdraw, she will receive r̃2 which is a portion
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of the remaining (nonliquidated) investment’s payoff at t = 2. If at t = 1 too many agents
withdraw and the bank is unable to recover enough from liquidating its assets to pay the
promised r1 to depositors, then there will be a sequential service of withdrawal requests, i.e.
the first (1+e)γ
nr1
depositors receive r1 and the rest receive 0. Agents who are certain about
their type as patient agents not needing liquidity at t = 1 are offered the equity contract
rather than the demand deposit contract, which distributes all residual payoff at t = 2.
Equity holders also can specify both the level of risk in the portfolio and the deposit rate
(subject to competitive constraints described below). Further, I price the equity contract
such that it satisfies individual rationality for certainly patient types.
Because we allow equity holders to specify both the deposit rate and portfolio risk,
the issue of rent extraction deserves delicate treatment.3 Otherwise, shareholders could take
excessive advantage of depositors. I find it reasonable to imagine that the banking industry
witnesses free entry, and therefore bank equity holders face a competitive floor on the deposit
rate r1 they can use to attract depositors. Certainly patient agents are thereby indifferent
between holding the equity claim and depositing their own money in the bank. In other
words, Ecertainly patient [u (shares)] = Ecertainly patient [u (deposit)] (the individual rationality
constraint). Therefore we will simplify our analysis and think of the banking industry as a
single bank.
To compare this bank to our social planner from earlier, consider if the bank sets
r1 = c
FB
1 . If only impatient agents will withdraw at t = 1, the expected utility of patient
depositors from waiting until t = 2 will be F̂i (θ) ·u (r1 · r̃2 (θ)), and as long as this is greater
3This issue does not arise in the previous Diamond-Dybvig run literature, because agents financing the
bank have typically been assumed to be homogeneous in their liquidity needs. The addition of heterogeneous
investors to the model is a main contribution of this paper.
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than u (r1) , only impatient agents will demand early withdrawal, and the first-best allocation
will be a possible equilibrium. However, because the bank cannot contract upon types, runs
are still possible where all depositors choose to withdraw at t = 1, and receive r1 with
probability (1+e)γ
r1
. Any agent who deviates and chooses to wait until t = 2 will get 0, unless
e > r1
γ





, i.e. the bank has so much equity it can credibly absorb the
liquidation of its entire deposit base and still offer any remaining depositor a sufficiently
enticing deposit r2 to not withdraw.
2.2 Payoff Information: Private Signals for Unique Equilibrium
At t = 1, depositors that are not liquidity-shocked (fraction (1− λ) of the initial depositors)
receive a signal θj that denotes the probability of the risky project succeeding. Agents’ prior
is that θ ∼ N (0, 1) . The probability of success of a project is prob(success) = F̂i (θ), where
F̂i (·) denotes the mean-shifted cumulative standard normal N (µi, 1) distribution function.
When θ is realized from the distribution, each agent j receives an individual signal θj = θ+εj,
where εj ∼ N (0, σ2ε) represents noise in the observation. This feature will allow us to have
signals with unbounded support, which will be useful later in our analysis. It also lets agents
rationally coordinate their actions (withdraw or stay) via a thresholding decision, and I can
thereby determine the ex ante probability of a run on the bank. This ex ante probability
of a run allows bank shareholders to choose the optimal level of risk in their portfolio, and
allows a social planner to understand the optimal capital structure of the bank.
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2.2.1 Renegotiation at t = 1
The bank management receives a signal θbank with the same type of noise as depositors’
signal, and reveals that signal to depositors through the setting of the deposit rate r2 for
staying until project’s completion. I assume r2 ≥ 1 to maintain incentive compatibility for
patient depositors who stay, and interest is compounded–depositors who stay are promised
r1 ·r2 in total. Because bank shareholders are seeking to maximize their own profits, they will
offer the minimum r2 ≥ 1 such that the remaining mass (1− λ) of depositors are indifferent
between staying (possibly getting r1 ·r2 at t = 2), and leaving (getting r1 if they are lucky and
end up early enough in line to withdraw, or else getting 0). However r2 is also bounded from
above by the level of bank equity that can be pledged to depositors. If depositors observe
the risk of failure generally to be very high, the bank can’t credibly offer a high enough
r2 to satisfy depositors, so depositors will choose to run. If the depositors withdraw (run),
the bank is forced to redeem deposits and if it faces sufficiently high liquidation costs from
redeeming deposits (γ is sufficiently low), the equity holders will be left with nothing–all
project value will have been liquidated and t = 2 payoff is 0. Otherwise, the bank gets to
wait until t = 2 to find out whether the project succeeds or not.
I assume that at the extremes of signals, agents no longer care about what other patient
depositors choose to do, their action becomes completely independent. This assumption
allows us to obtain a threshold equilibrium, where depositors run below a threshold signal
and choose to stay if their signal is above the threshold.
For a very low signal the probability of success is very low, and therefore the expected
utility of waiting until period 2 is near zero. We can define a lower extreme below an
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arbitrarily low signal where the probablity of success is be arbitrarily close to zero. Because
the expectd utility of withdrawing at t = 1 is always positive (receiving r1 with probability ≥
(1+e)γ
r1
and 0 otherwise), the patient agent finds it optimal to run, regardless of her expectation
of n, the number of other depositors who choose to withdraw early. I denote the point of a
depositor’s indifference between running and staying at t = 1 as θi (r1, r∗2)=θi s.t.
u (r1) = F̂i (θi) · u (r1r∗2)
where
r∗2 =





represents the maximum credible r2 the bank can promise depositors. Any depositor who
receives a signal in the region of signals (−∞, θi (r1, r∗2)) will choose to run regardless of
others’ actions, and regardless of the deposit rate offered.




wherein any depositor will choose to stay,
regardless of others’ actions. I do this by truncating the distribution of θi at some value θ̄i




= 1.4 Given this assumption, our proposed
region of dominant staying behavior is consistent: regardless of her belief about other agents’
actions, a patient depositor offered r2 ≥ 1 has no reason to run, since agents can withdraw at
most r1 from the bank in aggregate, and the market value of bank assets is (1 + e) ·Ri > r1.
Even though I can assume θi arbitrarily small, and θ̄i arbitrarily large, the existence of
4Assume that there exists an outside investor who is always willing to buy riskless assets at the risk-free
rate (zero in our model) from anyone, including the bank. When the fundamental signal θi is extremely high,
the long-term return Riis now risklessly guaranteed due to the truncated distribution, and so I assume that
there are agents willing to purchase the asset from the bank without a penalty, should the bank be forced
to liquidate assets.
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these two regions of dominant behavior will cause knock-on effects on the inference of agents
with signals near to but outside of either of these two regions, which will cause the region of
agent indifference between the two strategies (withdrawing or staying) to collapse to a single
point θ∗i , where ∀ θi < θ∗i the dominant strategy is to withdraw, and ∀ θi > θ∗i , the dominant
strategy is to stay. This is because an agent receiving a signal θij = θi + εsmall will infer that
some of her fellow depositors received a signal θik < θi meaning those depositors will surely
run. For εsmall small enough, sufficiently many of her fellow depositors will likely run that
agent j finds it optimal to also run, since she knows she cannot any longer hope to receive
the full amount r1r∗2 from waiting. Similarly an agent receiving a signal θij = θ̄i − εsmall
will infer that some of her fellow depositors received a signal in the upper dominance region,
and therefore will certainly not run. For εsmall small enough, agent j will find it optimal to
also stay, since the probability of success is so close to 1 and the risk of a run big enough to
break the bank (because of depositors receiving lower signals) is so small. Therefore these
dominance regions influence behavior potentially far from the regions themselves, since agents
are taking into account the actions of their neighbors (fellow depositors receiving lower or
higher signals), who are in turn taking into account the actions of their neighbors, and so on
until the actions are consistent with the dominance regions. From this argument we arrive
at the conclusion given by Theorem 1:
Theorem 1: the model has a unique equilibrium in which agents run if they observe
a signal θij below a threshold signal θ∗i (r1, r∗2) and they do not run if they observe
a signal above that.
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2.2.2 Proof
At t = 1, after depositors have received their own individual signal θij as well as the bank



















and denote the probability density function of the posterior
as f̃ij (θ). Therefore all depositors will have equal uncertainty σ̂ = σ̂i ∀j. The posterior of
all agents will incoroproate the bank’s weighted signal θbank
2+(σ2ε/σ2θ)
(in expectation this is zero).
Note that this is why we made the technical assumption about the distribution of θ̃ earlier.
Given r2, r1, D, E, γ, and λ, depositors calculate the threshold quality of the project,
i.e. a value θ∗ such that for posterior θ̃ij ≥ θ∗, depositor j will not run. A depositor’s utility
differential from staying with the bank versus running is given by















(1 + e) γ
r1
≥ n ≥ λ
0− (1 + e)
n · r1
· u (r1) if 1 ≥ n ≥
(1 + e) γ
r1
Because v is monotonically decreasing whenever it is positive, it satisfies one-sided strategic
complementarities.
I seek to demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium by first showing
that only a single unique threshold equilibrium exists. Then I will show that all equilibria
of this game are threshold equilibria. Threshold equilibria mean equilibrium strategies in
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which all patient depositors run if their signal is below some common threshold θ∗and do
not run if they observe a signal above θ∗.
If I restrict solutions to threshold equilibria, I can consider a depositor j’s expected
utility differential at t = 1 given a posterior signal θ̃ij. I call this expectation function
∆ij
(
r1, r2, θ̃ij, θ̇
)
, where θ̇ is assumed to be the common posterior threshold signal below
which depositors run, and above which they stay. Given a posterior θ̃ij > θ̇, this means
the expected value differential of staying rather than running is positive, (and for θ̃ij < θ̇,
expected differential is negative). Note that agent j’s posterior is distributed over θ̃ij ∼
N (µ̂ij, σ̂
2
i ), and therefore I can express the expected differential as:
∆ij
(











· f̃ij (θ) dθ (2.5)
Where n is the proportion of agents who are liquidity constrained, as well as those who
receive a signal θ̃ij < θ̇:
n
(
θ, θ̇ (r1, r2, θ)
)
= λ+ (1− λ) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
1{θ<θ̇} · ḟ (θ) dθ (2.6)
Because v is monotonically decreasing whenever positive, f̃i and ḟ are weakly positive,
and n is weakly increasing in θ̇, this means ∆ij is monotonically decreasing in θ̇ and positive
for θ̇ = −∞, negative for θ̇ = ∞, and so by the single crossing property we have a unique
equilibrium, given by threshold signal θ̇.
As a simplifying technique from the global games literature, I will focus on the cases




becomes a step function with
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value λ when θ ≥ θ̇ and 1 otherwise. This allows us to proceed by method of backward
induction to investigate the optimal t = 0 choice of Ri by the bank.
2.3 Solving the Model: Backward Induction
Given a particular realization of the fundamental θi at t = 1, I can determine whether a
bank run occurs, using the thresholding argument of Theorem 1. Working backwards, I can
then say what the t = 0 ex ante likelihood is of observing a realization θi < θ∗i (r1, r∗2) which
would cause a run. This then informs the bank’s choice of r1, the short-term deposit rate, and
allows us to calculate the shareholders’ (certainly patient agents’) expected utility for a given
level of risk choice Ri. From that shareholders are able to maximize their expected utility
by choosing the optimal level of project risk Ri, and I as an observer can then comment on
the social optimality of bank risk-taking as well as certain social planner policies that affect
the bank’s decisions such as bank capital requiremens, deposit insurance, and suspension of
convertibility.
I can assume that all agents are rational and anticipate future actions, therefore I can
seek to identify the bank’s optimal choice of risk at T = 0 by backward induction:
Note that at T = 1, bank management offers r2 (θ, r1) to maximize equity value:
r2 = min r2
s.t. depositors don′t run
⇒ r2 s.t. θ∗ = θobserved
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I get r2 by solving indifference equation for r∗2 ≥ 1–this sensibility constraint assumes
intuitively that the bank won’t offer negative interest, to carry intuition from an infinitely
repeated game.
At r2 = r∗2, given a realization of θ, I have depositors (indifferently) choosing to stay
with the bank and not run unless they are liquidity constrained–>n = λ (assuming that
ε→ 0 so in the limit there is no uncertainty).
Given that knowledge about n when r2 = r∗2, this greatly simplifies our solution for r∗2:
u (r1) = u (r1r
∗
2) for riskless debt
(
F̂i (θ) = 1
)
→ r∗,riskless2 = 1 (2.7)




· u (0) for risky debt
⇒ u (r1r∗2) =
u (r1)
F̂i (θ)







Now I can continue backwards induction to note that at T = 0:





















· f (θ) dθ
I want to solve for r1 (Ri), then I can solve for Roptimal as a function of our parameters
(most especially e, the capital ratio parameter). To do this, call θ the lowest value of θ given
r1 s.t. the management can offer r∗2 to prevent a run–any realization of θ < θ will result in
a run by the depositors. On the other hand, any realization θ > θ will not result in a run,
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because shareholders get 0 in the event of a run, and non-negative payoff if depositors do
not run, so they will offer r2 sufficiently high whenever possible. This allows us to express
our solution of r1 (Ri) more intuitively:
Ecertainly patient [u (deposit)] = Ecertainly patient [u (equity shares)]
⇒ prob (run) · u (r1) ·






















+ prob(success⋂no run) · u

(
1 + e− λr1γ
)
Ri − (1− λ) r1r2
e

⇒ F (θ∗) · u (r1) ·
(1 + e) γ
r1
+ u (r1r2) · (1− F (θ∗)) ·
∫ ∞
θ=θ∗
F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ






1 + e− λr1γ
)
Ri − (1− λ) r1r2
e
 F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ
+F (θ∗) · u

(




 · ∫ θ∗
θ=−∞
F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ
Therefore r1 is simply the solution to the above equation–although the analytical so-
lution is not readily tractable, the numerical solution is straightforward.
I’ve been using θ̄ without fully defining it; now is an appropriate point to do that.
I definedθ∗ as the minimum realization of θ at which the bank shareholders can credibly









⇒ r∗2 (θ∗, r1) =



















































Now I can use θ∗ to calculate r1 given Ri (from above):
0 =
[
F (θ∗) · u (r1) ·
(1 + e) γ
r1
+ u (r1r2) · (1− F (θ∗)) ·
∫ ∞
θ=θ∗
F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ
]






1 + e− λr1γ
)
Ri − (1− λ) r1r2
e
 F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ
−F (θ∗) · u

(




 · ∫ θ∗
θ=−∞
F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ
= F (θ∗) · u (r1) ·
(1 + e) γ
r1




F (θ∗) · u

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+ (1− F (θ∗)) · u

(
1 + e− λr1γ
)







 F̂ (θ) f (θ) dθ




















are both decreasing functions of r1, and u(r1)r1 is a
decreasing function of r1. Therefore a uniques solution for r1 can be shown to exist. The
root of the backward induction problem is thus the optimal selection of Ri, the risk
parameter, by bank shareholders.
Atomistic bank shareholders seek to maximize their expected utility:
R∗ = argmax
Ri
Ecertainly patient [u (shares)]
s.t. R ≤ Ri (assumed risk boundaries)
Where











































·Ri − (1− n) · r1r2
e
+



















·Ri − (1− n) · r1r2
e
+
 · F̂i (θ)
 · f (θ) dθ
(s.t. 0 ≤ R (assumed risk boundaries))
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Where of course n is a function of θ, r1, and r2, r2 is a function of θ and r1, and r1 is a
(formidable) function of Ri. While this problem is still analytically difficult, numerically it
is now tractable.
2.4 Social Welfare Implications–the Viability of Banks
A social welfare planner seeking to maximize the total welfare of all agents in the economy
can consider at least three forms of risk-sharing besides autarky. The “coinsurance” form
arises from a Diamond-Dybvig type model where there are no certainly patient depositors.
The “coinsurance for uncertain agents, mutual fund for certain agents” line of proposals put
forward by Admati (2013) and others, where banks would be completely equity-financed and
therefore could share some of the characteristics of a private equity firm or mutual fund. My
model exhibits welfare tradeoffs between the liquidity risk sharing of these otehr models, and
endogenous portfolio risk sharing between bank shareholders and depositors.
I earlier established that in autarky, aggregate expected utility can be expressed as
λ · u (γ) + (1 + e− λ) · u (Ri) · F̂i (µsignal = 0)
= λ · u (γ) + (1 + e− λ) ·R
where ∀i, R = u (Ri) · F̂i (0) > u (γ) is the expected return on any risky investment (I
had adjusted µi|Ri to make that the case ∀i).





Given an initial ratio of e certainly patient agents for each uncertain agent, and asset expected
returns R, I can infer first that the bank will choose project i with promised successful payout
Ri, and I can express the aggregate expected utility of agents as
F (θ∗i ) ·












+F (θ∗i ) ·










 F̂i (θ) f (θ) dθ
 (2.9)
+ (1− F (θ∗i )) ·
(
λ · u (r1) + (1− λ) ·
∫ ∞
θ=θ∗I
u (r1r2) · F̂i (θ) f (θ) dθ
)
+ (1− F (θ∗i )) ·





1 + e− λr1
γ
)
Ri − (1− λ) r1r2
e
 F̂i (θ) f (θ) dθ

The second-period deposit rate r2 is chosen by the bank to me the minimum r2 > 1 given
the bank’s signal about project quality θi, bank that will prevent a run. First-period de-
posit rate r1 is chosen competitively by the bank such that Ecertainly patient [u (deposit)] =
Ecertainly patient [u (equity shares)], by our constraing on bank rent extraction. This implies
r1 > γ, i.e. there is risk-sharing offered by the certainly patient shareholders to the uncertain
depositors. I also note that F (θ∗i )–the ex ante probality of a run–is a decreasing function
of the risk premium R, because F̂i (·) is an increasing function of R and therefore θ∗i is a
decreasing function of R. Similarly, I also note that run probability F (θ∗i ) decreases when
the liquidation value γ of assets decreases–depositors become “trapped” by the prospect of
withdrawing early and the expected payoff from running on the bank decreases. Therefore,
as R increases, the weight on the first main term in Eq. (7) decreases. As R → ∞, the
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equation for aggregate social welfare becomes
λ · u (r1) + (1− λ) · ∫ ∞
θ=−∞






1 + e− λr1γ
)
RI − (1− λ) r1r2
e
 · 1 · f (θ) dθ

Additionally, I note that as F (θ∗I ) → 0, E [r2] must go to 1, because the expected
payoff to a depositor from waiting will come to dominate the payoff from running. At the





, again because of
the competition constraint on r1 mentioned earlier. As E [r2]→ 1, this means E [u (r1r2)]→
u (r1), and therefore aggregate welfare under a bank becomes
(λ · u (r1) + (1− λ) · u (r1) + e · u (r1)) = (1 + e) · u (r1)
Because the aggregate payoff under a bank is the same as under autarky–a portion
of exactly λ depositors withdraw early–the total aggregate consumption in either case is
λ · γ + (1 + e− λ) · Ri. However, aggregate utility must be higher with a bank than with
autarky: consumption utility preferences are concave, and the bank offers each agent r1 in
the limit, whereas autarky doesn’t allow for equalizing payoffs. Thus there is clearly a set
of parameters where banking is viable, and I can explore the dimensions of this set using
numerical simulations, as well as compare mixed-capital structure banks with all-equity
banks. Because the Diamond-Dybvig model does not admit a unique equilibrium, we will
refrain from comparison directly, but we will examine the effectiveness of stabilizing measures
mentioned in that paper.
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Figure 2.1. Optimal Portfolio Choice When Capital Ratio Increases
The horizontal axis shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). The vertical axis shows an individual share-
holder’s expected utility at t = 0 from taking that level of risk. From left to right, each subfigure increases
the ratio of equity in the bank’s capital structure, from 10%, to 20%, to 30%. The choice of risk which
maximizes shareholder expected utility is highlighted in each figure. This optimal risk choice Ri increases as
the capital ratio increases (left to right), indicating shareholders prefer riskier portfolios as capital increases
2.5 Simulation Results
For equity holders, simulation results verify that there is an optimal choice of risk, which
depends on the bank’s level of capital. As the bank becomes better capitalized, it takes on
more risk in absolute terms (Ri increases):
However the per-shareholder risk Ri
e
is declining in e. This means that although abso-
lute portfolio risk increases, the probability of a run decreases, and the bank is safer:
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Figure 2.5. Initial Deposit Rate When Capital Ratio Increases
The horizontal axis shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). The vertical axis shows the 1-period deposit
rate offered by the bank to depositors at t = 0 (r1). From left to right, each subfigure increases the ratio
of equity in the bank’s capital structure, from 10%, to 20%, to 30%. The choice of risk which maximizes
shareholder expected utility is highlighted in each figure. This optimal risk choice Ri increases as the capital
ratio increases (left to right), however the deposit rate r1 decreases, indicating less risk-sharing between
shareholders and depositors.
Figure 2.3. Probability of a Run When Bank Capital Ratio Increases
The horizontal axis shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). The vertical axis shows the ex ante (t = 0)
probability of a run at t = 1 from taking that level of risk. From left to right, each subfigure increases the
ratio of equity in the bank’s capital structure, from 10%, to 20%, to 30%. The choice of risk which maximizes
shareholder expected utility is highlighted in each figure. This optimal risk choice Ri increases as the capital
ratio increases (left to right), however the ex ante level of run risk is actually decreasing.
One key interaction that remains to be discussed is the actual liquidity insurance
provision that I expressed by the deposit rate r1. As bank equity increases, depositors will
receive less promised payment r1, because they are more likely to be repaid by shareholders.
Therefore the amount of ex-ante risk-sharing among financial agents has decreased.
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Figure 2.7. Expected Second-Round Deposit Rate When Capital Ratio Increases
The horizontal axis shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). The vertical axis shows the 1-period deposit
rate offered by the bank to depositors at t = 1 (r2). From left to right, each subfigure increases the ratio
of equity in the bank’s capital structure, from 10%, to 20%, to 30%. The choice of risk which maximizes
shareholder expected utility is highlighted in each figure. This optimal risk choice Ri increases as the capital
ratio increases (left to right), and the deposit rate r2 increases as well. This allows equity owners to share
portfolio risk with long-lived depositors, who no longer face liquidity risk.
Because the portfolio has become more risky in absolute terms, the intermediate deposit
rate r2 will rise as equity rises. This means risk-sharing now occurs at the intermediate stage
rather than the initial stage: at t = 0 the shareholders bear more run risk, but they get
funded with a lower deposit rate r1. At t = 1, the shareholders are then able to share greater
risk with the remaining depositors, who now are homogeneous agents with the equity holders
(both are “long-lived” agents) and are only distinguished by the contracts they hold. Thus
having greater equity capital allows the bank to better separate liquidity risk from portfolio
risk, which is an interesting finding.
In terms of expected social welfare, however, I see that the socially optimal choice of
risk is less than the level of risk chosen by shareholders:
Therefore, the bank is able to extract private benefits that reduce overall utility by
taking excessive risk.
I can instead briefly turn our attention to the earlier-stage problem of this game:
the optimal level of bank capital. Given that the social planner cannot restrict the level
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Figure 2.9. Expected Social Welfare For A Given Level of Capital
The horizontal axis shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). The vertical axis shows the expected social
welfare (from both equity owners and depositors) from a bank’s choice of portfolio risk Ri. The level of bank
equity capital is fixed at 20%. The choice of risk which maximizes shareholder expected utility is highlighted,
as well as the choice of risk which would maximize social welfare. This optimal risk choice Ri is greater for
shareholders than for society as a whole.
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of portfolio risk taken by the bank, the social planner can still seek for a “second-best”
outcome by requiring a certain level of bank capital, which will then naturally produce a
certain level of portfolio risk by the bank. Therefore the social planner faces a trade-off: as
we saw, greater equity leads to greater portfolio risk choice Ri and greater period 1 risk-
sharing through deposit rate r2. However, r1 falls, meaning what I observe is less liquidity
risk-sharing (which is captured in the r1 term only, since at t = 1 there is no longer any
unrealized liquidity risk). Thus a greater level of equity brings less liquidity risk-sharing
and more portfolio risk-sharing. It is the tradeoff between these two factors that gives us
an optimal level of bank capital. Below we plot the normalized expected social welfare
(normalized to account for the changing asset base (1 + e) as e increases):
Interestingly, a low capital ratio can be better than a higher capital ratio. This is
because for low levels of bank capital, the bank is well-disciplined by depositors, and chooses
a level of portfolio risk closer to the social optimum. Additionally, it offers a higher r1,
meaning greater liquidity risk insurance provided by the bank to depositors. While there is
less portfolio risk-sharing at low levels of equity, the overall effect is higher social welfare.
At very high levels of equity capital, very little liquidity risk sharing occurs, but the bank
shareholders are able to extract more value from the limited liability put option by taking
greater portfolio risk.
2.6 Optimal Bank Regulation Policies’
I consider the social welfare implications of a capital subsidy, which can be thought of either
in the form of underpriced deposit insurance or a too-big-to-fail implicit government backing
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Figure 2.10. Expected Social Welfare When Capital Ratio Increases
The horizontal axis shows a given capital ratio, which varies from ε% to (100-ε)%. The vertical axis shows
the expected social welfare (from both equity owners and depositors) from a bank’s choice of portfolio risk
Ri, that shareholders will rationally choose given a level of equity.
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of the banking sector. I will also in a later iteration consider the effects of suspension of
convertibility on social welfare.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE/CAPITAL SUBSIDY:
Under a capital subsidy, depositors see the bank as having more capital than they actu-
ally have raised through shareholders. However, the bank clearly can’t use it’s “phantom
capital” to increase its portfolio size, it can only exploit this capital through the value it
has in the eyes of depositors. We can call the total level of capital observed by depositors
etotal = eshares + esubsidy. Clearly, the role in our model of a capital subsidy is to reduce the
likelihood of a run on the bank. For a given level of risk Ri, the threshold signal decreases












θ∗i, capital subsidy = F̂
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Because the denominator increases, the fraction inside decreases, which makes F̂−1i (·) de-
crease, because F̂i (·) is an increasing function of θ. Therefore, the threshold required signal
decreases, which means F (θ∗i ), the likelihood of a run, decreases when a capital subsidy is
introduced. Below we can see simulation results for a capital subsidy of 10% of deposits, as
the level of actual equity/deposits increases from 10% to 30%:
When I allow the social planner to (costlessly) offer deposit insurance, we see that
the bank clearly engages in moral hazard and takes more portfolio risk, beyond the socially
optimal amount.
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Figure 2.11. Choice of Risk and Social Welfare with Significant Deposit Insur-
ance
The horizontal axis in both subfigures shows a given level of portfolio risk (Ri). In the left subfigure, the
vertical axis shows an individual shareholder’s expected utility at t = 0 from taking that level of risk. The
right subfigure shows the expected social welfare (from both equity owners and depositors) from a bank’s
choice of portfolio risk Ri, when the capital ratio is fixed at 20% and deposit insurance is fixed at 50%. The
choice of risk which maximizes shareholder expected utility is highlighted in each figure.
2.7 Conclusion
I find that banks can be a viable institution, meaning they improve social welfare over
autarky. As the level of bank capital increases, banks take on more portfolio risk and
provide less liquidity insurance to depositors. At the intermediate stage of the game t = 1
when remaining depositors now know they do not face a liquidity shock, shareholders engage
in welfare-improving risk-sharing with the remaining depositors. The main source of welfare
loss as the ratio of shareholders to depositors increases is the reduction in liquidity provision
that short-term depositors suffer, as well as risk-shifting by shareholders taking additional
portfolio risk.
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Further research from this model could include accounting for the transmission of fi-
nancial panics to the real sector, to quantify additional costs of a bank run. Additionally, one
could explore the pricing of deposit insurance in this particular model, as well as the social
cost of limited liability, to better measure the tradeoffs between different bank regulation
policies. I leave it to future papers to seek to tie this strain of bank run literature to the
contributions of Diamond & Rajan (2000) concerning bank information rents and negotiat-
ing strength and their influence on the optimal level of bank capital. Given the prevalent
and growing need for credit, liquidity, and maturity transformation that is being witnessed
in world markets today, this type of analysis could also be of use in understanding the dy-
namics of other short-term funding markets such as repurchase agreements, money-market
mutual funds, and the non-traditional financial intermediation that has been termed “shadow
banking.” The interaction of liquidity demanders and suppliers is not confined solely to the
banking sector, and effective modern policy would do well by seeking to regulate the fea-
tures of contracts such as demand deposits, rather than only addressing sets of institutions.
Effective regulation should understand that capital requirements are not without potential
downsides when economic agents are allowed to be strategic.
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Additional Repo Market Information
A.1. Window Dressing and Lehman’s Repo 105 Scheme
When financial institutions such as banks must report results on a predictable quarterly
schedule, they may be tempted to alter their portfolio just before the period ends to appear
safer or more profitable than they really are. This practice is called window dressing, after
the way retail shops stage their store windows to attract customers. For example, if a bank’s
capital requirement is assessed against its end-of-quarter portfolio of assets, that bank can
sell assets at the end of the quarter so it can operate with less equity. This also boosts the
bank’s return on equity and earnings per share, which can increase the share price or bring
management bigger bonuses.
If most banks window dress their quarter-end financial statements, rational investors
and regulators might simply assume all banks are gaming their disclosures, and filter out
the window dressing so share prices are unaffected. This would penalize banks that do
not window dress (but are assumed to), so window dressing becomes a dominant strategy.
However, the practice is harmful because regulators need accurate information in order to
protect shareholders and monitor effectively, and window dressing makes it more difficult to
detect an emerging systemic risk. During the 2007–08 subprime mortgage crisis, Lehman
Brothers used window dressing to hide risk in a bid to stay alive that ultimately jeopardized
the entire financial system.
On September 10, 2008, rating agency Moody’s Investor Services, Inc. threatened to
downgrade Lehman Brothers’ credit rating after several potential buyers walked away from
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a deal with Lehman, and after Lehman announced a projected $3.9 billion loss for the quar-
ter. Lehman’s stock price immediately collapsed by 42%, and by the end of the week, it
was unable to find lenders willing to roll over its $150 billion of overnight tri-party repo
financing. On September 15, Lehman filed for bankruptcy, with $639 billion in assets, mak-
ing it the largest bankruptcy in history. Lehman’s bankruptcy caused the Reserve Primary
money market fund to “break the buck,” which in turn triggered a run on money markets
that threatened the entire U.S. financial system and required unprecedented government
intervention. In a subsequent bankruptcy report led by special examiner Anton Valukas,
Lehman’s chief executive Richard Fuld revealed that “rating agencies were particularly fo-
cused on net leverage; Lehman knew it had to report favorable net leverage numbers to
maintain its ratings and confidence.”
In order to present a low leverage ratio despite mounting losses over the prior year,
Lehman had resorted to a now-notorious scheme called “Repo 105.” In Repo 105, Lehman
would accept a 5% haircut on fixed-income assets it pledged as collateral in a repurchase
agreement that extended across the end of a quarter, and then buy back those same assets
once the new quarter began. Because of the high (and therefore expensive) haircut, Lehman
was able to account for the transaction as a “true sale” instead of financing. This reduced
Lehman’s reported balance sheet by as much as $50 billion—reducing reported net leverage
from 13.9 to 12.1 for the second quarter of 2008.
Lehman had not disclosed its use of Repo 105 to regulators, rating agencies, investors,
or even its own board of directors. When the Valukas report revealed the practice, the SEC
conducted an inquiry of 24 U.S. public financial institutions and concluded that Lehman’s
window dressing was an isolated case. However, using confidential regulatory data on U.S.
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tri-party repurchase agreements since July 1, 2008, I show that a very similar form of window
dressing continues to occur every quarter among non-U.S. banks: every quarter end, roughly
$170 billion of banks’ most liquid assets are pulled out of repo, and then immediately brought
back once a new quarter begins (see Figure 20). To give some perspective, that is over half




Figure 12. Daily Tri-Party Repo Outstanding
The vertical axis represents the value in trillions of dollars of collateral outstanding pledged in repo each
day from July 1, 2008, to July 31, 2014. Quarter-ends are marked with vertical dashed lines, and year-ends
are marked with heavier dash-dotted lines. I exclude repo borrowing by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Furthermore, I exclude the dates of 7/17/2008 and 4/11/2013, because of missing data from one of
the clearing banks.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Figure 13. Average Tri-Party Repo Outstanding Each Day of a Quarter
This figure represents the average daily repo outstanding over the course of a single quarter. The average
quarter has 62 trading days, and I position the end of the quarter (marked by a vertical line) in the middle
of the figure to highlight the quarter-end decline and subsequent rebound of repo borrowing. The vertical
axis represents the market value of collateral in trillions of dollars.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Figure 14. Repo Outstanding Each Day of a Quarter, by Type of Collateral
I separate the average repo outstanding over a single quarter by type of collateral. The solid blue line
uses the left axis, and represents average repo borrowing backed by fed-eligible collateral: U.S. Treasuries,
agency debentures, and agency mortgage-backed securities, and agency collateralized mortgage obligations.
The dotted red line uses the right axis and represents average repo borrowing backed by all other types of
collateral. Both axes are in trillions of dollars.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Figure 15. Repo Outstanding Each Day of a Quarter by Dealer Region
This figure presents the average repo outstanding over a single quarter separated by the region of the repo
cash borrower (i.e., the dealer that is pledging collateral in the repo). The left and right axes are both
in billions of dollars. I exclude non-bank dealers from this subplot. The dotted green line represents repo
borrowing by U.S. bank dealers, and can also be distinguished by its distinct behavior: this line touches
the left axis at roughly $780 billion and does not dip as markedly as the other two lines at the end of the
quarter. The solid blue line represents repo borrowing by European bank dealers. Both U.S. and European
bank dealer repo borrowing are in reference to the left axis. The dashed red line shows Japanese bank dealer
repo borrowing, and because Japanese bank dealers are a much smaller segment of the repo market, I plot
their line using the right axis.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
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Solving the bank runs model by backward induction
Given a particular realization of the fundamental θi at t = 1, I can determine whether a
bank run occurs, using the thresholding argument of Theorem 1. Working backwards, I can
then say what the t = 0 ex ante likelihood is of observing a realization θi < θ∗i (r1, r∗2) which
would cause a run. This then informs the bank’s choice of r1, the short-term deposit rate,
and allows us to calculate the shareholders’ (certainly patient agents’) expected utility for
a given level of risk choice Ri. From that shareholders are able to maximize their expected
utility by choosing the optimal level of project risk Ri, and I can then make a comment on
the social optimality of bank risk-taking as well as certain social planner policies that affect
the bank’s decisions such as bank capital requiremens, deposit insurance, and suspension of
convertibility.
I assume that all agents are rational and anticipate future actions, therefore I seek to
identify the bank’s optimal choice of risk at T = 0 by backward induction:
Note that at T = 1, bank management offers r2 (θ, r1) to maximize equity value:
r2 = min r2
s.t. depositors don′t run
⇒ r2 s.t. θ∗ = θobserved
I get r2 by solving indifference equation for r∗2 ≥ 1–this sensibility constraint assumes
intuitively that bank won’t offer negative interest, to carry intuition from an infinitely re-
peated game.
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At r2 = r∗2, given a realization of θ, we have depositors (indifferently) choosing to stay
with the bank and not run unless they are liquidity constrained–>n = λ (assuming that
ε→ 0 so in the limit there is no uncertainty).
Given that knowledge about n when r2 = r∗2, this greatly simplifies our solution for r∗2:
u (r1) = u (r1r
∗
2) for riskless debt
(
F̂i (θ) = 1
)
→ r∗,riskless2 = 1 (10)




· u (0) for risky debt
⇒ u (r1r∗2) =
u (r1)
F̂i (θ)







Now I can continue our backwards induction to note that at T = 0:





















· f (θ) dθ
I want to solve for r1 (Ri), then we can solve for Roptimal as a function of our parameters
(most especially e, the capital ratio parameter). To do this, call θ the lowest value of θ given
r1 s.t. the management can offer r∗2 to prevent a run–any realization of θ < θ will result in
a run by the depositors. On the other hand, any realization θ > θ will not result in a run,
because shareholders get 0 in the event of a run, and non-negative payoff if depositors do
not run, so they will offer r2 sufficiently high whenever possible. This allows us to express
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our solution of r1 (Ri) more intuitively:
Ecertainly patient [u (deposit)] = Ecertainly patient [u (equity shares)]
⇒ prob (run) · u (r1) ·
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Therefore r1 is simply the solution to the above equation–although the analytical so-
lution is not readily tractable, the numerical solution is straightforward.
I’ve been using θ̄ without fully defining it; let’s do that now. θ∗ is the minimum
realization of θ at which the bank shareholders can credibly promist r2 high enough to stop
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= F (θ∗) ·
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are both decreasing functions of r1,
and u(r1)
r1
is a decreasing function of r1. Therefore a uniques solution for r1 can be shown
to exist. Now I have the apparatus required to get to the root of the backward induction
problem: the optimal selection of Ri, the risk parameter, by bank shareholders.
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Atomistic bank shareholders seek to maximize their expected utility:
R∗ = argmax
Ri
Ecertainly patient [u (shares)]
s.t. R ≤ Ri (assumed risk boundaries)
Where
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(s.t. 0 ≤ R (assumed risk boundaries))
Where of course n is a function of θ, r1, and r2, r2 is a function of θ and r1, and r1 is a
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